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PUBLIC PENSIONS AND FIDUCIARY LAW: A VIEW FROM
EQUITY
T. Leigh Anenson, J.D., LL.M.*
ABSTRACT
Controversies involving fund management may be the next frontier of public
pension litigation. Recent scandals involving fraud, bribery, and corruption of
public pension officials and other third parties have drawn the public eye toward
the management of retirement assets. Individual and entity custodians, including
pension boards of trustees, are charged with making investment and other decisions
relating to pension funds. Unlike private pensions, there is no federal oversight of
asset managers or others in control of retirement funds. Yet these funds hold more
than three trillion dollars in assets. Until now, the guardians of these monies have
operated almost invisibly in the background of the public pension crisis.
This Article advances the retirement reform debate by looking more closely at the
fiduciary relationship that exists between trustees and beneficiaries involving public
sector employee pension funds. It offers a singular view from historic equity. The
Article aims to see how equity in the medieval world relates to the modern pension
problem. From that viewpoint, it evaluates what the fiduciary relation means, or
should mean, in the changing legal environment of public retirement systems.
The main objective is to raise issues involving fiduciary law and public pen-
sions that have been undervalued or ignored. Based upon fiduciary law’s ancestry
in equity, the Article offers guidance in assigning and defining obligations and
associated remedies in the government pension situation. It contemplates the equi-
table dimension of the public pension problem, analyzes circumstances where
fiduciary violations may arise, and suggests possible outcomes. It also comments on
deficiencies in current law. Overall, the Article provides a deeper perspective of the
fiduciary principle and corresponding doctrine in the context of government retire-
ment systems.
* Associate Professor of Business Law, University of Maryland; Associate Director,
Center for the Study of Business Ethics, Regulation, and Crime; Senior Fellow, Business Law
& Taxation, Monash University; Of Counsel, Reminger Co., L.P.A.; lanenson@rhsmith.
umd.edu. A special thank you to Karen Eilers Lahey, Dana Muir, and Paul Secunda for their
insightful comments on the manuscript at different stages. The paper also benefitted from
the research assistance of Natasha Domek and Chris Harris. Part of this work derives from my
talk on public pension governance at the Public Pension Plans and Private Funds
Conference, Lowell Milken Institute for Business Law and Public Policy, UCLA School of
Law, and published in the 2016 PRIVATE FUND REPORT.
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INTRODUCTION
Recent scandals involving fraud, bribery, and corruption of pub-
lic pension officials and other third parties have drawn the public
eye toward the management of retirement assets.1 Individual and
entity custodians, including pension boards of trustees, are charged
with making investment and other decisions relating to pension
funds.2 These funds hold more than three trillion dollars in assets.3
Until now, the guardians of these monies have operated almost in-
visibly in the background of the public pension crisis.4
In certain states like California, citizens entrusted the pension
board with additional authority over fund management.5 Californi-
ans thought that increasing the responsibilities of these caretakers
1. See, e.g., Richard E. Mendales, Federalism and Fiduciaries: A New Framework for Protecting
State Benefit Funds, 62 DRAKE L. REV. 503, 507 n.13 (2013) (citing 2012–13 cases filed by the
SEC alleging investment advisors to public pension fund stole more than three million dol-
lars and claiming that the public pension fund was defrauded by broker dealer and its former
executive “by selling [the fund] unsuitably risky and complex financial instruments”); Bill
Trott, SEC Charges Atlanta Firm Over Public Pension Funds, REUTERS (May 21, 2015), http://
www.reuters.com/Article/us-usa-sec-fraud- idUSKBN0O620D20150521 (explaining that the
SEC charged an Atlanta firm with breaching its responsibility to act in the best interest of the
pension funds by recommending investments in an alternative fund called GrayCo Alterna-
tive Partners II LP).
2. See infra Part III (outlining the governance structure of public retirement systems);
Karen Eilers Lahey & T. Leigh Anenson, Public Pension Liability: Why Reform is Necessary to Save
the Retirement of State Employees, 21 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 307, 310–11 (2007)
(“In the public sector, the trust fund manager is generally a politically appointed or member-
elected retirement board that makes investment decisions and determines funding levels and
contribution obligations.”); see also NASRA Issue Brief: State and Local Government Spending on
Public Employee Retirement Systems, NAT’L ASS’N OF ST. RET. ADM’RS 3 (May 2014), http://
www.nasra.org/files/Issue%20Briefs/NASRACostsBrief.pdf (explaining that more than 200
billion dollars are paid annually from pension funds to public retirees and their beneficiaries
across the United States).
3. See Phillip Vidal, Annual Survey of Public Pensions: State- and Locally-Administered Defined
Benefit Data Summary Report: 2014, U.S. DEP’T. OF COM., ECON. AND STAT. ADMIN. 2 (July 2015),
http://www2.census.gov/govs/retire/g14-aspp-sl.pdf (showing total investments in public
pension funds); see also Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua Rauh, Public Pension Promises: How Big Are
They and What Are They Worth?, 66 J. FIN. 1211, 1213 (2011) (noting that the 116 state plans
studied had $1.94 trillion in total assets in 2009); id. at 1215 (estimating that local plans hold
$560 billion in assets).
4. Scholarly interest in the public pension funding problem is a recent phenomenon
and coincides with a series of financial setbacks suffered by economies worldwide. See Ste-
phen P. D’Arcy et al., Optimal Funding of State Employee Pension System, 66 J. RISK & INS. 345,
346–47 (1999) (comparing the volume of research done on private pension funding with the
lack of research on state pension funding). Ten years ago, I was among a group of scholars
that raised awareness of a souring investment climate risking thousands of government work-
ers’ pensions. See Lahey & Anenson, supra note 2, at 309 (describing the degree of financial
distress in public pensions throughout the country and aiming to “begin the debate about
public retirement plans”).
5. See Bd. of Admin. of the Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Wilson, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207, 223
(Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (explaining series of pension reforms in the 1980s).
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vis-à-vis the political branches was best to ensure the safety of their
retirement assets.6 News headlines have confirmed, however, that
the primary protectors of public pensions have been sleeping sen-
tinels or worse.7
For example, the California Public Employees’ Retirement Sys-
tem (CalPERS),8 the largest pension plan in the country,9 recently
disclosed that it could not track the fees that it pays to private equity
firms.10 Certain caretakers of the fund additionally may have con-
flicts of interest that jeopardize impartial decision-making.11 These
reports follow an investigation into the pension fund that uncov-
ered fraud and bribery by its former chief executive officer and
board member.12
6. Id. (explaining reform of the state pension board that gave it sole control of actua-
rial services to stop executive and legislative raiding of pension funds); Singh v. Bd. of Ret.,
49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 220, 228 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (“Proposition 162 was thus intended by its
proponents to insulate the administration of retirement systems from oversight and control
by legislative and executive authorities, and also return control of the actuarial function to
the retirement boards themselves. This increased level of independence would make the
[retirement] systems less of a target for local and state officials looking for a way to balance a
budget.”) (internal quotations omitted); see also T. Leigh Anenson, Alex Slabaugh & Karen
Eilers Lahey, Reforming Public Pensions, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 36, 39 (2014) (commenting
on how state legislators dip into pension funds to pay unrelated bills and suggesting reforms
to prevent the misuse and removal of assets by political branches).
7. See Emily Holbrook, Pension Fraud Frenzy, RISK MGMT. MAG. (Oct. 1, 2010, 4:40 PM),
http:// www.rmmagazine.com/2010/ 10/01/pension-fraud-frenzy/ (providing a roundup of
litigation regarding pension fraud); Editorial, Pension Fund Shenanigans, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20,
2004, at A12 (discussing trustee mismanagement costing state pension systems multiple mil-
lions of dollars).
8. See generally Facts at a Glance, CAL. PUB. EMPS.’ RET. SYS., https://www.calpers.ca.gov/
docs/forms-publications/facts-at-a-glance.pdf (last updated July 8, 2016).
9. See Lahey & Anenson, supra note 2, at 309, 320 (clarifying that CalPERS is the largest
when measuring the plan in assets).
10. Alexandra Stevenson, Calpers’s Disclosure On Fees Brings Surprise, And Scrutiny, N.Y.
TIMES (June 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/26/business/dealbook/calperss-
disclosure-on-fees-brings-surprise-and-scrutiny.html?ref=topics. A pension fraud investigator
started a crowd fund to examine the fees that CalPERS pays as well as to search for potential
conflicts of interest between its executives and placement agents (middlemen it hires to help
it find money managers) and Wall Street. Id.
11. Id. Since 2011, CalPERS has had a policy that prevents its consultants from manag-
ing any of its private equity, real estate, or other nonpublic assets. Dan Fitzpatrick, Lawmaker:
Pension Advisers Need a Closer Look, WALL ST. J. (June 8, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
lawmakerpensionadvisersneedacloserlook1402267163. But other public pension systems
(even in California) allow outside consultants to serve in controversial dual roles as pension
advisors and asset managers. Id. (reporting that the Washington State Investment Board and
the California State Teachers’ Retirement System do not absolutely bar the prospect of dual
roles).
12. Stevenson, supra note 10. CalPERS spent $11 million to investigate its use of place-
ment agents as part of a wider pay-to-play scandal across the industry. Id. See also Luzerne Cty.
Ret. Bd. v. Makowski, 627 F. Supp. 2d 506 (M.D. Penn. 2007) (covering a litigation against
former board members, money managers, accountants, actuaries, and auditors that resulted
from pay-to-play scheme). CalPERS’s chief executive officer between 2002 and 2008 and a
former-board-member-turned-placement-agent were subsequently charged with criminal
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The internal operations of public retirement systems require fur-
ther investigation. Unlike private pensions, there is no federal
regulation of asset managers or others in control of such monies.13
A growing literature on public pension reform rarely attends to the
powers and responsibilities of the keepers of retirement funds.14 All
states recognize that pension assets are held in trust and that man-
agers are fiduciaries.15 Yet there appears to be no comprehensive
study and comparison of their duties.16 The laws are written in gen-
eral terms and those terms, even when imposing common duties,
can differ from state to state.17 Because of the broad language and
other variances in the expression of fiduciary obligations, the spe-
cific substantive standards and available remedies are not readily
apparent.18
What duties do, or should, the public pension protectors owe the
plan members and beneficiaries? In what respect have they failed to
fraud. Stevenson, supra note 10. The CEO pleaded guilty in 2014 to conspiracy to commit
bribery and fraud. Id. The former board member, who pleaded not guilty, committed suicide
in 2015. Id. Earlier, California used a $900 million pension obligation bond to help cover its
debts because of increased benefits and fiscal mismanagement. Lahey & Anenson, supra note
2, at 321.
13. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2000).
Public pension fiduciaries are not regulated by ERISA but are subject to applicable federal
and state securities and other laws. For instance, California’s criminal law codifies the com-
mon law rule prohibiting conflicts of interest of public officials and “is concerned with
ferreting out any financial conflicts of interest, other than remote or minimal ones, that
might impair public officials from discharging their fiduciary duties with undivided loyalty
and allegiance to the public entities they are obligated to serve.” Lexin v. Superior Court, 222
P.3d 214, 229 (Cal. 2010) (finding evidence supported allegations of conflict of interest
against former members of city retirement board). With private pensions as well, the “tril-
lions of dollars held in pension plans are an enticing target for intermediaries and service
providers who are opportunistic, desperate, or just plain greedy.” Dana M. Muir, Decentralized
Enforcement to Combat Financial Wrongdoing in Pensions: What Types of Watchdogs Are Necessary to
Keep the Foxes Out of the Henhouse?, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 33, 34 (2016) [hereinafter Muir, Decentral-
ized Enforcement To Combat Financial Wrongdoing in Pensions].
14. For recent articles focusing on fiduciary relations in the public pension setting, see
Mendales, supra note 1, at 512–13 (calling for minimum standards of conduct for plan fiduci-
aries and an Office of the Inspector General to police their behavior); David H. Webber, The
Use and Abuse of Labor’s Capital, 98 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2106, 2168–69 (2014) (calling for an ex-
panded duty of loyalty with respect to investments). Commentators have recognized that the
imposition of fiduciary standards is an important part of any package of pension reform
proposals. See, e.g., Anenson, Slabaugh & Lahey, supra note 6, at 39 (explaining that legal
reform should ensure that administrators act solely in the interest of pension plan
participants).
15. See Governance, NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE RET. ADM’RS, http://www.nasra.org/govern
ance (last visted Oct. 12, 2016) [hereinafter Governance]; infra Part II (summarizing fiduciary
law in the context of government retirement systems).
16. See Appendix (providing a state-wide comparison of the fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty).
17. See infra Parts III & IV (analyzing duties owed by public pension plan fiduciaries).
18. It is beyond the scope of this Article to compile and compare the case law existing in
each state.
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live up to those obligations? What remedies are available for the
breach? This Article begins to answer these questions. It is a prelim-
inary inquiry and not an exhaustive analysis.
This Article attempts to understand the role and responsibilities
of public pension managers in light of the fiduciary principle that
developed in the private law of equity. It argues that looking to the
past can help inform present and future issues involving fiduciaries’
obligations in the public pension setting.19 The Article uses histori-
cal context to draw out a number of ideas and impressions in order
to more generally discuss the fiduciary obligations of pension
boards and other third-party trustees in managing public pension
systems. Along these lines, it shows how private law principles relat-
ing to fiduciaries and the trust can be applied in a public law
setting.
The inquiry should assist policy-makers and courts in creating,
interpreting, and applying fiduciary standards, and pension manag-
ers and financial intermediaries in complying with them. While the
focus is on framing (rather than resolving) the problems faced by
public pension plans, the analysis should inform the form and con-
tent of the duties themselves and help identify when they are
breached.
Part I provides a brief synopsis of the fiduciary framework and
places public pension fund managers within it. Part II examines the
antecedents of the fiduciary principle in equity jurisprudence and
its evolution in the private law of trusts. Part III outlines the govern-
ance structure of public retirement systems. Drawing from laws on
the books of several states, it also describes particular duties owed
by public pension plan fiduciaries to participants. Based on this his-
torical and functional understanding of the fiduciary relationship,
Part IV contemplates what the responsibilities of public pension
fund managers should be. It describes current controversies and
criticism surrounding fiduciary behavior relating to government re-
tirement systems, and evaluates actual and hypothetical fiduciary
lapses.
This Article concludes that the protections of the fiduciary prin-
ciple founded in private law should not be abandoned or
diminished in the public pension context. As a result, governments
seeking to reform fiduciary law should strengthen existing obliga-
tions that inure to the benefit of plan participants. Courts should
19. T. Leigh Anenson & Gideon Mark, Inequitable Conduct in Retrospective: Understanding
Unclean Hands in Patent Remedies, 62 AM. U.L. REV. 1441, 1461 (2013) (“While equitable doc-
trines have never been cast in stone . . . their resolution requires a hard look at past practices
and principles.”).
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also be aware of the similarities and critical differences between fi-
duciary relations prevailing in the public pension situation and its
equitable antecedents in adjudicating these duties.
I. UNDERSTANDING FIDUCIARY LAW
The obligations owed by the overseers of retirement assets to
plan members and their beneficiaries are fixed to, and function
within, the boundaries of a fiduciary relationship. The existence of
discretion is a critical component of fiduciary status.20 There are
many different kinds of fiduciary relations.21 Common to all of
them is a reliance interest inherent in the nature of the relation-
ship.22 Essentially, the fiduciary relation is one of special trust,
confidence, and dependence where fiduciaries are held accounta-
ble should they abuse their position.23 Justice Cardozo’s now
famous formulation captures the essence of fiduciary obligation:
“Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those
acting at arm’s length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary
ties. . . . Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most
sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.”24
When owners place their property under the exclusive direction
and control of others to manage for the owner’s benefit, the legal
arrangement is typically called a “trust.”25 Thus, like all fiduciary
relationships, the structure of the relation itself affords a special
20. D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399,
1402, 1447 (2002); Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation,
1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 908 (“Common characteristics of such relationships include the fiduci-
ary’s commitment to exercise discretion in a fashion that affects the interests of the
beneficiary and the fiduciary’s obligation to exercise that discretion on the beneficiary’s
behalf.”).
21. See, e.g., PETER W. YOUNG ET AL., ON EQUITY § 7.140, at 521 (2009) (describing differ-
ent kinds of relations that qualify as fiduciary); see also Paul B. Miller, A Theory of Fiduciary
Liability, 56 MCGILL L.J. 235, 241–52 (2011) (discussing status-based and fact-based fiduciary
relationships).
22. YOUNG ET AL, supra note 21, § 7.40, at 509 (explaining that a reliance interest is an
implied element of all fiduciary relationships).
23. See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 808–09, 816, 824–32 (1983).
24. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). Courts and commentators, both
here and abroad, often quote Justice Cardozo’s expression of the fiduciary concept. See Dana
M. Muir, Fiduciary Status as an Employer’s Shield: The Perversity of ERISA Fiduciary Law, 2 U. PA.
LAB. & EMP. L. 391, 391 (2000) [hereinafter Muir, The Perversity of ERISA Fiduciary Law] (pro-
viding a list of U.S. authorities that rely on Justice Cardozo’s explanation).
25. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (2003) (defining a trust); see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 3(3) (1959) (traditional trust law defines a trustee as “[t]he person
holding property in trust.”); see also DeMott, supra note 20, at 881 (“The term ‘fiduciary’ itself
was adopted to apply to situations falling short of ‘trusts,’ but in which one person was none-
theless obliged to act like a trustee.”).
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opportunity for the property manager (trustee) to exercise power
and control over the property to the detriment of the owner’s funds
(beneficiaries). To prevent such dangers, the law imposes duties of
undivided loyalty and reasonable care along with severe penalties
for breach, including the disgorgement of unjust gains.26 More pre-
cisely, a trustee must act with reasonable prudence in administering
trust property and comport with the standard of a prudent investor
in investing assets.27 A trustee must also act exclusively in the inter-
est of the beneficiary.28 Their responsibilities include appropriate
disclosure, such as furnishing accurate information about the trust
property.29
Since its origins in equity, the law has drawn upon the principles
of fiduciary obligation to govern its most pressing problems.30 The
modernization of fiduciary doctrine to fit contemporary concerns
raises issues about the proper scope of the obligations owed by
trustees and other fiduciaries to their beneficiaries.31 One area that
26. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 25, §§ 170–232.
27. In investing trust assets, a trustee must comport with the standard of a prudent inves-
tor. Id. § 227. To the extent the trust provides specific instructions regarding the propriety of
investments, the trustee generally must obey those instructions. Id. While administering the
trust, a trustee must act in accordance with a standard of ordinary prudence. Id. If, however,
the trustee represents herself as having skills that meet a higher standard, the trustee will be
held to that higher standard. Id. § 174.
28. A trustee must act “solely in the interest of the beneficiary.” Id. § 170. Other aspects
of the duty of loyalty include the requirement that a trustee must be impartial in the treat-
ment of multiple current beneficiaries and multiple successive beneficiaries. Id. §§ 183, 232.
29. Whenever a trustee is dealing with the beneficiary on the trustee’s own account, the
trustee must act fairly and communicate all known material information as well as that infor-
mation that the trustee should know. Id. § 170. A trustee also must maintain accounts for the
trust. Id. § 172. A trustee must additionally furnish “complete and accurate information as to
the nature and amount of the trust property” to the beneficiaries of the trust. Id. § 173.
30. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. &
ECON. 425, 432–34 (1993) (discussing some of the many topics to which the label “fiduciary”
is applied); Frankel, supra note 23, at 797 (“Courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies
increasingly draw on fiduciary law to answer problems caused by . . . social changes.”); Jerry
W. Markham, Fiduciary Duties Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 199,
214–18 (1992) (exploring the expansion of fiduciary duties to new categories of persons);
L.S. Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69, 71–72 (1962) (discussing the evolu-
tion of fiduciary relationships in modern law).
31. See DeMott, supra note 20, at 879 (“Fiduciary obligation is one of the most elusive
concepts in Anglo-American law.”). Depending on context, scholars have argued to raise or
lower traditional fiduciary standards. See, e.g., Daniel B. Bogart, Liability of Directors of Chapter
11 Debtors in Possession: “Don’t Look Back—Something May be Gaining on You,” 68 AM. BANKR. L.J.
155, 159 (1994) (arguing that the fiduciary standards applied to directors of a debtor in
possession are stricter than the usual standard of corporate governance); Lawrence E. Mitch-
ell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1675, 1678–79 (1990)
(“The self-interest of officers and directors in the corporation and its assets, and the wide
discretion granted them in the performance of their jobs, have led courts to abandon any
attempt to hold corporate fiduciaries to the same high standard of conduct required of other
fiduciaries.”) (citation omitted); Allan W. Vestal, Fundamental Contractarian Error in the Revised
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has absorbed and adapted ancient fiduciary law is the management
of public pensions.32 But there have been few attempts to track the
transformation of fiduciary principles, a major branch of private
law, into the public realm.33
All fifty states authorize the assets of public retirement systems to
be held in trust.34 The states also clothe their pension boards, and
others undertaking a managerial role with respect to pension assets,
with fiduciary status.35 The respective fiduciary duties of designated
governing bodies and third parties may arise under state constitu-
tions, statutes, and common law.36 The obligations imposed on the
board and third party managers include duties of undivided loyalty
and reasonable care that are at the core of fiduciary law.37
The language by which these duties are expressed, however, is
diverse.38 The judicial gloss afforded by state courts in interpreting
Uniform Partnership Act of 1992, 73 B.U. L. REV. 523, 524–30 (1993) (discussing the Revised
Uniform Partnership Act’s limitation on the fiduciary duties among partners).
32. See Muir, The Perversity of ERISA Fiduciary Law, supra note 24, at 406 (analyzing ERISA
and arguing that “[b]ecause of its widely applicable, flexible, and adaptable nature, a fiduci-
ary regime could be relied upon to adapt to changing benefit plan typology and practice”).
33. See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text.
34. Governance, supra note 15. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 238.660(1) (2015) (declaring the
Public Employees Retirement System a trust fund and the Board the trustee).
35. Governance, supra note 15; discussion infra Part III. See, e.g., Kaho’ohanohano v. State,
162 P.3d 696, 706 (Haw. 2007) (“Pursuant to HRS chapter 88, Trustees owe a fiduciary duty
to the retirement system itself, as well as to members of the system.”) (citing HAW. REV. STAT.
§§ 88-22, 88-23 (1993)); Ayman v. Teachers’ Ret. Bd. of New Yok, 193 N.Y.S.2d 2, 22 (N.Y.
1959) (holding that the relationship between members of the Teachers’ Retirement Associa-
tion of the Teachers’ Retirement System and the retirement board is a fiduciary one); see also
Luzerne Cty. Ret. Bd. v. Makowski, 627 F. Supp. 2d 506, 565 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (explaining that
former retirement board members owed fiduciary duties to the fund pursuant to state statute
and assuming that financial advisors and money managers also owed fiduciary duties to the
fund).
36. The sources of fiduciary obligations in most states are statutes. Multiple sources,
however, may apply to resolve a given dispute. See State ex rel. Pub. Emps. Ret. Ass’n v. Lon-
gacre, 33 P.3d 906, 908–09 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001) (discussing the retirement board as trustee
and fiduciary under the Constitution, statute, and board regulation), rev’d on other grounds, 59
P.3d 500, 502 (N.M. 2002). For recent cases involving lapses in the management of public
pensions, see Milliman, Inc. v. Md. State Ret. & Pension Sys., 25 A.3d 988 (Md. 2011) (hold-
ing actuary liable for breach of contract due to miscalculation, over twenty-two years, of
contributions needed for three state pension funds); O’Brien v. S.C. Orbit, 668 S.E.2d 396
(S.C. 2008) (holding that the City of Charleston violated the South Carolina Constitution by
attempting to invest government funds in the ORBIT trust involving equity securities).
37. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 17(a)–(d) (expressing exclusive purpose and pru-
dent man fiduciary rules and the duty of diversification); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5931(a), (e)
(2014) (requiring Pennsylvania public pension trustees to comply with the exclusive purpose
and prudent person rules).
38. See Appendix (surveying similarities and differences in the statutory duty of care
across states); see also Webber, supra note 14, at 2188 (Appendix) (noting general similarities
and differences in the duty of loyalty across states).
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the legal texts makes fiduciary standards more variable still.39 As
such, the substance of even core obligations may differ from state to
state. Certain duties also diverge from their equitable tradition.40
To date, the call for uniform standards of fiduciary responsibility in
the management of public retirement systems across states has been
unsuccessful.41
The fiduciary framework is critical to ensuring that pension plans
sponsored by government employers contain sufficient monies to
provide expected and needed benefits. The next Part describes the
foundation of the fiduciary principle in equity as a way of analyzing
the scope and content of fiduciary duties, as well as the import of
fiduciary relations, in the public pension field.
II. ANALYZING FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS IN EQUITY
This Part studies the traditional equitable environment where fi-
duciary relations have arisen as a way of looking at the problem in
public pension systems.42 The evaluation should help comprehend
challenges involving the obligations of pension boards and other
fiduciaries to their fund beneficiaries.
The fiduciary principle is a product of equity.43 To be sure, fidu-
ciary law is considered the “heart of equity.”44 And the trust,
39. See discussion infra Part II (discussing judicial interpretations based on private pen-
sion law and the common law of trusts).
40. For example, Wyoming constricted the scope of the fiduciary obligation by requiring
intentional conduct to trigger liability. See infra note 176. In California, an intermediate ap-
pellate court interpreted its constitutional provisions imposing fiduciary duties to require less
than private trust law. See Bandt v. Bd. of Ret., San Diego Cty. Emps. Ret. Ass’n, 38 Cal. Rptr.
3d 544, 559 (Ct. App. 2006) (declaring that there is no constitutional fiduciary obligation for
the retirement board to act in a manner consistent with the principle of intergenerational
equity); supra note 28.
41. Only a few states have adopted the Uniform Management of Public Employee Re-
tirement System Act (UMPERSA). Lahey & Anenson, supra note 2, at 329–31; see UNIF. MGMT.
OF PUB. EMP. RET. SYS. ACT, 7A U.L.A. 336 (1997), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/
docs/management_public_employee_retirement_systems/mpersa_amdraft_approved_jul97.
pdf. Wyoming was the first state to adopt the substance of the uniform law, followed by Mary-
land after its pension fund management was subject to public scrutiny. Anenson, Slabaugh &
Lahey, supra note 6, at 39. South Carolina also incorporated the fiduciary portions of
UMPERSA into its Code. Id.
42. This Article makes no attempt to trace the trust from its origins in the historic law of
uses. Rather, it relies on fundamental ideas underlying equity and the fiduciary relation.
43. Henry E. Smith, Why Fiduciary Law Is Equitable, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
FIDUCIARY LAW 261 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014); see also T. Leigh Anenson &
Donald O. Mayer, “Clean Hands” and the CEO: Equity as an Antidote to Excessive Compensation, 12
U. PA. J. BUS. L. 947, 971 (2010) (“Fiduciary duties are rooted in ancient equity and are often
emphasized with respect to the importance of the preservation of equity in the modern com-
mercial world.”).
44. Smith, supra note 43, at 283.
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especially, is acknowledged as one of equity’s most celebrated cre-
ations.45 Given its antecedents in equity jurisprudence, state courts
have found the judge-made law of equity germane to understand-
ing the role and responsibilities of public pension trustees.46
Equitable ideas affect how judges interpret positive law as well as
how they understand legislative silence.47
There are, of course, other contexts for comparison.48 Additional
perspectives would provide a multidimensional view of the fiduciary
issue for public pensions. For example, the regulation of private
pensions and the duties of fiduciaries under the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act (ERISA) would be an obvious choice for
analysis.49 Yet even ERISA is supposed to be based on the equitable
45. Id. at 263. See generally Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, 56 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 53, 69 (1993) (explaining that “the equitable law of trusts has displaced the cumber-
some common law of future interests” and that “the concept of fiduciary duty has spread
from express trusts to the whole range of principal-agent relationships, and is influencing
relationships traditionally thought to be arm’s-length, such as buyer-seller and debtor-
creditor”).
46. See Petition of Eskeland, 101 A.3d 11, 18 (N.H. 2014) (“Under the common law of
trusts, the board of trustees owes the [System’s] members and beneficiaries a fiduciary obliga-
tion to manage the [System] for the benefit of its members and beneficiaries.”) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hill v. Vanderbilt Capital Advisors, LLC,
834 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1244 (D.N.M. 2011) (“New Mexico is not alone in applying the law of
trusts to public pension funds; courts in numerous jurisdictions have made the same
determination.”).
47. See Arken v. City of Portland, 263 P.3d 975, 980 (Or. 2011) (explaining that public
pension trust funds are administered by applicable statute and default rules of general trust
law); see also T. Leigh Anenson, Equitable Defenses in the Age of Statutes, at 23–24, 38–39 (work-
ing paper, on file with author) [hereinafter Anenson, Age of Statutes] (explaining how the
content of equitable principles in statutes are derived from state law); Daniel A. Farber, Equi-
table Discretion, Legal Duties, and Environmental Injunctions, U. PITT. L. REV. 513, 513 (1984)
(analyzing assumption of equitable discretion in interpreting statutory remedies); see generally
T. Leigh Anenson, Statutory Interpretation, Judicial Discretion, and Equitable Defenses, at 7–15
(working paper, on file with author) [hereinafter Anenson, Statutory Interpretation] (identify-
ing the background assumption of equitable defenses in interpreting federal statues); David
Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 936–37 (1992)
(commenting on the common law canon as one of many background assumptions that re-
flect continuity and change in statutory interpretation).
48. Associations that would add dimensions to the problem include the regulation of
private pensions under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and corpo-
rate law. As to the latter, it would be beneficial to compare the duties of the pension board
and other third-parties in administering public retirement systems with the duties owed by
directors and officers in managing the corporation. See Anenson & Mayer, supra note 43, at
1008 (“Early equity tradition reflects the prevailing belief that corporate management has
ethical responsibilities that the common law—and equity—can help discharge.”).
49. If there is shared language, state courts often refer to ERISA in adjudicating fiduci-
ary duties pursuant to state legislation. See Webber, supra note 14, at 2119–21 (“An odd
feature of the legal landscape for public pension fiduciary duties is that any analysis usually
begins by reference to an inapplicable federal statute, ERISA.”); id. at 2121 (explaining that
ERISA operates as a type of “shadow law” for public pension fund fiduciary duties, governing
the funds’ conduct even though it is both inapplicable and unenforceable against them); id.
at 2120 (“[T]here are many sharp distinctions between ERISA and state pension codes.”).
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law of trusts.50 Thus, while this Article looks through only one lens,
it is an important one. The idea is to advance a theoretical frame-
work for thinking about the role of equity in the fiduciary law of
government retirement funds. An equitable model of decision mak-
ing, along with its development of ethically-based substantive
standards, should inform the way that fiduciary principles and doc-
trines are created and interpreted in safeguarding public
retirement systems.51
The English Court of Chancery had jurisdiction over matters of
equity.52 Sir Thomas More, the first Lord Chancellor drawn from
Public pension reform proposals have urged to extend ERISA to public pension law. See Paul
M. Secunda, Litigating for the Future of Public Pensions, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1353, 1402–04
(2014). ERISA’s fiduciary rules, however, may need strengthening. See Anne Tucker, Retire-
ment Revolution: Unmitigated Risks in the Defined Contribution Society, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 153,
215–16 (2013) (proposing reforms to ERISA fiduciary law).
50. See Vanity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496 (1996) (recognizing that ERISA fiduciary
duties draw from the common law of trusts that governed pensions before the legislation);
Bd. of Trs. of N.H. Judicial Ret. Plan v. Sec’y of State, 7 A.3d 1166, 1173 (N.H. 2010) (citing
ERISA cases when analyzing public pension fiduciary duties due to their common source in
the common law of trusts); Muir, The Perversity of ERISA Fiduciary Law, supra note 24, at
396–97 (explaining that ERISA adopted the substantive standards of traditional trust law).
The Supreme Court, however, has been criticized for failing to adhere to ERISA. John
Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s Trail of Error in Russell, Mer-
tens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1343 (2003) [hereinafter Langbein, What
ERISA Means by “Equitable”].
51. Equity originated in the Middle Ages when the “might makes right” mentality
predominated among kings and commoners. T. Leigh Anenson, The Triumph of Equity: Equi-
table Estoppel in Modern Litigation, 27 REV. LITIG. 377, 384–85 (2008) [hereinafter Anenson,
The Triumph of Equity]. Catholic bishops, who were well-versed in canon law and became the
first chancellors, influenced these equity principles. See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 402–07 (1927) (discussing the long line of bishops and archbishops
serving as chancellors). Over time, the common law became more moral. See Anenson &
Mayer, supra note 43, at 979–83 (describing integration of equitable doctrines into the com-
mon law and statutes). Notwithstanding, equitable maxims and principles, and the doctrines
that derive from them, are still known for their more direct appeal to ethics and justice. See
Anenson, Age of Statutes, supra note 47, at 19 (“Equitable doctrines provide ‘individualized
justice . . . illuminated by moral principles.’”) (citing Philip A. Ryan, Equity: System or Process?,
45 GEO. L.J. 213, 217 (1957)).
52. The High Court of Chancery emerged as a separate forum for the administration of
equity in the fourteenth century. RALPH A. NEWMAN, EQUITY AND LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
22–23 (1961); see also 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 3 (2d ed. 1898) (explaining that Chancery was known at that time as the Curia Cancel-
lariae). The regimes of law and equity began with the royal prerogative of English kings to do
justice in any case between their subjects. Roger L. Severns, Nineteenth Century Equity: A Study
in Law Reform, 12 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 81, 90–91 (1934). Over time, it became customary for the
King to delegate his authority to administer justice to his secretary, the chancellor. William F.
Walsh, Equity Prior to the Chancellor’s Court, 17 GEO. L.J. 97, 100–06 (1929). The chancellor
was the head of Chancery and a great officer in the nature of a secretary of state or prime
minister. Garrard Glenn & Kenneth R. Redden, Equity: A Visit to the Founding Fathers, 31 VA. L.
REV. 753, 761 (1945).
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the ranks of the common lawyer,53 is said to have grounded the
authority of the Chancery in fraud, accident, and things of confi-
dence.54 These are the three general circumstances that moved the
conscience of the Chancellor.55 Confidence is often connected di-
rectly to the fiduciary relationship, and particularly to the trust.56
The idea of accident includes relief from forfeiture, which moti-
vates the fiduciary relation.57 Equitable fraud, furthermore, is more
expansive than common law fraud.58 The objective was to deter the
commission of the wrong and safeguard the public interest.59
Therefore, equity extended the ancient maxim that one should not
profit from their own wrong to include situations where it is hard to
tell if one was profiting from their own wrong.60 Activities regarded
as fraudulent in equity were done without any intention to deceive
53. See Anenson, The Triumph of Equity, supra note 51, at 379 n.4 (explaining that Sir
Thomas More was the first lawyer to be Lord Chancellor in 1529). Every chancellor from
1380 to 1488 was a church official. Thomas Edward Scrutton, Roman Law Influence in Chan-
cery, Church Courts, Admiralty, and Law Merchant, in SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL
HISTORY 208, 214–15 (Ass’n of Am. Law Schs. ed., 1907); see also Henry Arthur Hollond, Some
Early Chancellors, 9 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 17, 23 (1945) (indicating that the position was held by
laymen for only about twelve years during the fourteenth century).
54. R.P. MEAGHER, W.M.C. GUMMOW & J.F.R. LEHANE, EQUITY: DOCTRINES AND REMEDIES
§ 1207, at 339 (3d ed. 1992).
55. See 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 42, at 47 (14th ed.
1918) (The chancellor was the “dispenser of the king’s conscience.”). The process of refer-
ring petitions to the chancellor was common at the time of Edward I, but it was Edward III in
1349 that confirmed the procedure and ordered the chancellor to base his decision on “Hon-
esty, Equity, and Conscience.” 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 33–35,
38–40 (5th ed. 1941).
56. MEAGHER, GUMMOW & LEHANE, supra note 54, § 1207, at 339.
57. Id.
58. Anenson & Mark, supra note 19, at 1466–67; see also Anenson & Mayer, supra note 43,
at 968 n.79 (relating flexibility of fraud to confront novel economic strategems as well as
scholarly criticism of the Supreme Court’s stinting definition of securities fraud as providing
a roadmap for crooks).
59. Anenson & Mark, supra note 19, at 1467; 27A AM. JUR. 2d Equity § 5, at 552 (2013)
(“[F]raud in equity has a much broader connotation than at law and includes acts inconsis-
tent with fair dealing and good conscience . . . .”).
60. Smith, supra note 43, at 273. The prevention of an abuse of right is the motto of
many equitable defenses. See Anenson & Mark, supra note 19, at 1449–50 (explaining ratio-
nale of unclean hands); T. Leigh Anenson, From Theory to Practice: Analyzing Equitable Estoppel
Under a Pluralistic Model of Law, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 633, 662 (2007) [hereinafter Anen-
son, Pluralistic Model] (describing one of the purposes of estoppel as withholding aid to a
wrongdoer).
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or cheat.61 The state of mind was simply irrelevant.62 In certain situ-
ations, equity acted on simple negligence.63 In this manner,
equitable doctrines operated as a means of preventative justice and
corrective justice.64 Justice Joseph Story explains the equitable ver-
sion of fraud:
[It] was founded on the anxious desire of the law to apply the
principle of preventative justice, so as to shut out the induce-
ment to perpetrate the wrong, rather than to rely on mere
remedial justice after a wrong has been committed. By disarm-
ing the parties of all legal sanction and protection for their
acts, they suppress the temptations and encouragement which
might otherwise be found too strong for their virtue.65
These underlying notions of ancient equity align with the devel-
opment of fiduciary doctrine and the trust. Such situations
included a fiduciary pursuing their own interest.66 Recall that simi-
lar to other fiduciary relations, it is the structure of the relationship,
and especially the discretion afforded to the trustee, that gives the
trustee a unique ability to harm the beneficiary. Hence, the primary
duties of care and undivided loyalty that arise out of this discretion-
ary relationship of great dependence are quite broad.67
Professor Henry Smith reminds us that equitable principles are
aimed at preventing opportunism and that fiduciary law partakes of
61. MEAGHER, GUMMOW & LEHANE, supra note 54, § 1201, at 335 (equitable fraud is not
just actual, intentional, premeditated fraud); POMEROY, supra note 55, at § 399, at 99 n.17
(“Fraud, in equity, often consists in the unconscientious use of a legal advantage originally
gained with innocent intent . . . .”).
62. JOHN GLOVER, EQUITY, RESTITUTION & FRAUD, § 1.6, at 8 (2004) (“Moral culpability
. . . need not be proven to justify equitable fraud—it has a different role.”); Anenson & Mark,
supra note 19, at 1487 (discussing equity as a sliding scale where “courts employ stricter rules
of relatedness for inadvertence, and allow a more liberal connection for increasing levels of
cognition”); see also Anenson, Pluralistic Model, supra note 60, at 650 (examining the removal
of reliance and relaxation of intent for equitable estoppel in light of certain core concerns of
equity); Anenson, The Triumph of Equity, supra note 51, at 390–91, 398–400 (same).
63. Anenson & Mark, supra note 19, at 1467 n.161.
64. See T. Leigh Anenson, Beyond Chafee: A Process-Based Theory of Unclean Hands, 47 AM.
BUS. L.J. 509, 518 (2010) (describing the equitable defense of unclean hands, in the larger
context of equity jurisprudence, as equally concerned with preventative justice as well as re-
medial justice after the wrong is committed).
65. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 258, at 265 (13th ed.
1886).
66. MEAGHER, GUMMOW & LEHANE, supra note 54, at § 1210, at 341.
67. See Smith, supra note 43, at 273, 280–81.
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this attitude.68 Scholars in the private pension field agree.69 Profes-
sor Dana Muir, a leading authority on the regulation of private
pension funds, finds the idea of opportunism central to the correct
interpretation and application of fiduciary law.70 Combatting strate-
gic behavior calls for ex post discretion by courts to prevent and
remedy the problem.71 Smith argues that the treatment of equity as
a safety valve is the reason it should remain flexible and fuzzy
around the edges.72 After all, “equity was aiming at a moving tar-
get.”73 A certain degree of judicial discretion is effective to prevent
misbehavior without undermining legitimate expectations and chil-
ling desirable behavior.74 Of course, the need for some level of
open-endedness does not tell us much about particulars. But it does
explain something about the form of the laws themselves. It tells us
68. Id. at 273 (“Equity is an all-purpose anti-avoidance standard, and fiduciary law not
unexpectedly partakes of this approach.”); see also T. Leigh Anenson, The Role of Equity in
Employment Noncompetition Cases, 42 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 62–63 (2005) [hereinafter Anenson, Role
of Equity] (discussing how equitable defenses prevent gamesmanship and hypocrisy at the
expense of the court, the law, and other litigants).
69. See John H. Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, 6 SUP. CT. REV. 207, 216
(1990) (arguing that benefit determinations made over the long-term by repeat players raise
reputational costs that limit opportunistic behavior); Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein,
ERISA’s Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1132–33
(1988) (acknowledging situations where the long-term, repeat player constraints fail to oper-
ate effectively).
70. Muir, The Perversity of ERISA Fiduciary Law, supra note 24, at 393 (“Trust law tradition-
ally has used the concepts embodied in the fiduciary obligation to protect trust beneficiaries
from opportunistic behavior by trustees.”).
71. Smith, supra note 43, at 264–65 (explaining that equity cannot be too predictable
because opportunists will anticipate it and evade it as well as invent new ways of engaging in
such behavior); see also Anenson, Age of Statutes, supra note 47, at 18–23 (discussing judicial
discretion as a component of equitable defenses); Anenson, Statutory Interpretation, supra note
47, at 21–22 (explaining historical basis for equitable discretion).
72. Smith, supra note 43, at 264–65; see also Anenson, The Triumph of Equity, supra note
51, at 403–06 (describing the flexibility of equity and how estoppel has no exhaustive
formula); Anenson, Pluralistic Model, supra note 60, at 651 (explaining the embryonic charac-
ter of equitable doctrines).
73. Smith, supra note 43, at 269; see also Anenson & Mayer, supra note 43, at 995 (discuss-
ing the contours of the equitable clean hands doctrine and claiming that “[w]hat is
‘unclean,’ like what is fraud, necessitates some ambiguity to promote deterrence”).
74. Smith, supra note 43, at 278 (explaining the idea is to keep the law “unpredictable
enough to keep opportunists guessing but without destabilizing the law” for which it is a
safety valve); Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden & Henry E. Smith, The Supreme Court’s Acciden-
tal Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203, 235 (2012) (relating
the same idea for equitable remedies). See generally T. Leigh Anenson, Treating Equity Like
Law: A Post-Merger Justification of Unclean Hands, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 455, 461 (2008) [hereinafter
Anenson, Treating Equity Like Law] (discussing the value of discretion in the application and
extension of equitable defenses).
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why standards, rather than rules, generally accompanied an equita-
ble approach.75 Equity employed ex ante rules in the service of
combatting opportunism as well.76
Equity was over-inclusive,77 and one of equity’s most pronounced
prophylactive precepts is the fiduciary duty of loyalty.78 Traditional
trust law discourages self-interested fiduciaries.79 An undisclosed
conflict of interest—regardless of harm—often led to a presump-
tion against the fiduciary and per se liability and disgorgement.80 As
Smith explains, equity strikes down all disloyal acts, rather than try-
ing to distinguish the harmful from the harmless by permitting a
trustee to justify the representation of the two competing
interests.81
Indeed, a recognized authority on traditional equity, former Aus-
tralian High Court Justice William Gummow, advises that those who
believe it unfair or too stringent to hold a fiduciary liability for un-
authorized profits without an intent to deceive or sharp practice
“misunderstand the particular approach of the Chancellor in these
matters.”82 In this vein, fiduciaries are also liable without bad faith
or fraud.83 Even good faith is not a defense.84 Equity thus took an
extreme attitude towards the probable behavior.85
On a separate note, analyzing the common criteria found in fidu-
ciary relationships helps us appreciate those relationships in the
75. See Anenson & Mark, supra note 19, at 1514–17 (discussing how rule-based precepts
can be underinclusive for equitable doctrines aimed at preventing the unconscientious abuse
of rights); Anenson, Pluralistic Model, supra note 60, at 642–43 (discussing rules and standards
in the context of equitable doctrines).
76. Smith, supra note 43, at 271 (“[W]hat is an ex post safety valve in equity becomes the
general ex ante and untailored case in fiduciary law.”).
77. Id. at 280.
78. Id. at 271.
79. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 25, § 170 (1) cmts. a–h (listing
prohibited actions to trustees due to self-interest).
80. Smith, supra note 43, at 273; Charles Bryan Baron, Self-Dealing Trustees and the Exoner-
ation Clause: Can Trustees Ever Profit from Transactions Involving Trust Property?, 72 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 43, 45–54 (1998) (discussing prohibitions against certain self-dealing transactions). If a
trustee does engage in a self-interested transaction, the application of the “no further in-
quiry” rule essentially establishes an irrebuttable presumption that the trustee’s action was
wrongful and the transaction will be voided. See id. at 53–54.
81. Smith, supra note 43, at 274 (citing GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT,
THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 543, at 228 (rev. 2d ed. 1993)). The rationale for disal-
lowing conflict is to avoid self-serving rationalization that representing two conflicting
interests may cause a trustee’s judgment of the interests of the beneficiary to be less accurate.
Id. at 277–78 (citing Andrew S. Gold, The New Concept of Loyalty in Corporate Law, 43 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 457, 498–99 (2009) and Ira Samet, Guarding the Fiduciary’s Conscience—A Justifi-
cation of a Stringent Profit-stripping Rule, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 763 (2008)).
82. MEAGHER, GUMMOW & LEHANE, supra note 54, § 1201, at 335.
83. Smith, supra note 43, at 271.
84. Id.
85. See id.
266 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 50:2
public pension context. It will correspondingly inform the setting
of substantive standards for trustee fiduciaries. Professor Smith de-
scribes three criteria comprising the fiduciary relation in private
law: disproportionate hardship, hidden action, and vulnerability.86
These conditions separately concerned the early Court of Chan-
cery.87 The considerations collate in the fiduciary relationship.88
These collective concerns explain why the relationship is an en-
hanced form of equity.89 If fiduciary law is a “beefed up” version of
equity,90 then the public pension trust is the Big Mac. As described
below, the circumstances are more pronounced in the public pen-
sion scenario.
First, the demise of public pension systems will cause severe hard-
ship. Failing to provide the promised retirement benefits when due
results in financial devastation—or the very real possibility of such
destitution—to pension plan participants and their families.91 Gov-
ernment workers depend on pension assets to secure their
retirement. Many workers and retirees do not have access to Social
Security should their retirement plans fail.92 In fact, certain groups
of employees in the worst-funded pensions lack this federal safety
net.93 Moreover, unlike pensions offered by private companies, the
federal government does not oversee government pension plans,
nor are there any insurance programs that will bestow benefits if
86. Id. at 278.
87. See id. at 268–69; see also Anenson, Pluralistic Model, supra note 60, at 663 n.203 (ana-
lyzing equitable estoppel in light of equity’s interest in promoting fair play, protecting
weaker parties, and preserving the integrity of the justice system); B.C. Rogers Poultry, Inc. v.
Wedgeworth, 911 So. 2d 483, 493 (Miss. 2005) (“Equity comes to the aid of those who may
not or can not protect themselves.”).
88. Smith, supra note 43, at 270–71.
89. Id. at 272 (“Trusts and trust like relationships present great dangers of opportunism
that call for a broader and more stringent version of equity.”).
90. Id. at 270 (“Fiduciary law presents a more systematic problem of potential opportu-
nism that calls for more than a mere safety valve.”).
91. See Patricia E. Dilley, Hope We Die Before We Get Old: The Attack on Retirement, 12 ELDER
L.J. 245, 250–64 (2000) (discussing pensions, personal savings, and Social Security as the
“three legged stool” of retirement).
92. See Jack M. Beermann, Public Pension Crisis, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 20 (2013)
(noting that about one in four public employees do not contribute to the Social Security
System); see also Social Security Coverage, NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE RET. ADM’RS, http://
www.nasra.org/socialsecurity (discussing that more than one-third are public school teach-
ers, and the remaining two-thirds are firefighters, police officers, and first responders) (last
visited Oct. 14, 2016).
93. Anenson, Slabaugh & Lahey, supra note 6, at 6–7 (comparing fifty state defined ben-
efit pension plans for teachers and finding that the non-Social Security plans are at an even
greater risk of not being able to meet promised benefit payments).
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the government plan fails.94 Plan participants, presumably like most
Americans, also lack other savings to survive through old age.95
Second, in terms of hidden action, public pension plans are
shrouded in secrecy. For more than a decade now, academics and
activists have been calling for increased transparency to plan par-
ticipants and the public.96 Part of the problem is the absence of
uniform standards to compare the financial status of pension plans
between various public systems.97 Another issue involves overly opti-
mistic actuarial assumptions that minimize the pension funding
deficit.98 Without an effective way to evaluate their plans, partici-
pants do not know the security of their employer’s retirement
promises.99
Third, public pension plan participants are extremely vulnera-
ble. In comparison to other fiduciary relationships, such as those
94. Lahey & Anenson, supra note 2, at 314.
95. See EVERETT T. ALLEN ET AL., PENSION PLANNING: PENSION, PROFIT-SHARING, AND
OTHER DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLANS 7 (9th ed. 2003) (noting that personal savings rates
are “running at historically low levels”); see also Muir, Decentralized Enforcement To Combat Fi-
nancial Wrongdoing in Pensions, supra note 13, at 67 n.212 (“Lack of retirement plan coverage
strongly correlates with poverty of individuals in their fifties.”).
96. See Lahey & Anenson, supra note 2, at 329–31 (highlighting lack of uniformity as an
obstacle to public pension reform and advocating the adoption of the Uniform Management
of Public Employees Retirement Systems Act (UMPERSA) or minimum universal disclosure
rules akin to it); see also Daniel J. Kaspar, Defined Benefits, Undefined Costs: Moving Toward a
More Transparent Accounting of State Public Employee Pension Plans, 3 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 129
(2011) (proposing federal legislation that requires states to adopt a uniform standard for the
reporting and valuation of pension funding). For a summary of UMPERSA, see generally
Steven L. Willborn, Public Pensions and the Uniform Management of Public Employee Retirement
Systems Act, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 141 (1998); Management of Public Employee Retirement Systems Act
Summary, NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS (2014), http://www.uniformlaws.
org/ActSummary.aspx?titlemanagement%20of%20Public%20Employee%20Retirement%20
Systems%20Act (last visited Oct. 14, 2016).
97. Anenson, Slabaugh & Lahey, supra note 6, at 42–48 (discussing public pension re-
porting problems with transparency, uniformity and accuracy). There are different vesting
requirements, fiduciary standards, and reporting rules. See generally CYNTHIA L. MOORE, PUB-
LIC PENSION PLANS: THE STATE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK (2d ed. 1993) (discussing various
disclosure and reporting requirements in states). In a survey of state and local government
pension funds by the Government Finance Officers Association and the Public Pension Coor-
dinating Council, ninety percent had an annual report, but half of those systems distributed
it only on demand. David Hess, Protecting and Politicizing Public Pension Fund Assets: Empirical
Evidence on the Effects of Governance Structures and Practices, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 187, 191, 210
(2005).
98. Current reporting methods understate taxpayer liability. See Anenson, Slabaugh &
Lahey, supra note 6, at 46–88 (citing Moody’s Investors Service Report revealing that while
states had forty-eight cents of each dollar promised to current and future retirees in 2011,
they reported having seventy-four cents of each dollar owed to retirees) (citation omitted);
see infra Part IV (discussing potential liability for the failure to accurately evaluate liability
leading to inadequate funding and disclosure).
99. Anenson, Slabaugh & Lahey, supra note 6, at 46 (“Misrepresentations of the magni-
tude of fiscal stress are frequently credited as contributing to the imminent demise of many
public pension plans.”).
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found in corporate law, beneficiaries are often not financially
literate.100
Even if they were, participants are unable to estimate the risk to
their expected retirement savings given the absence of transparency
already discussed. Besides, few will be able to do much about it.
Assuming it is even possible for employees to uproot and transplant
themselves in another state with equivalent job prospects and a re-
tirement system that is not in jeopardy, it is not practical. Many
pension plans have built-in deterrents to prevent employees from
leaving their employment.101 Employees may lose employer contri-
butions if they have not satisfied the terms of service.102 As a result,
the mobility risk makes public pension participants more exposed
than workers in the private sector.103
Also, in addition to the three criteria identified by Smith above
regarding private fiduciary status, there is another concern at the
historic core of equity that is relevant to the fiduciary principle in
the public pension setting. This matter is not necessarily present in
private trusts or other fiduciary relations like those found in corpo-
rate law.104 Yet this consideration is paramount to understanding
the way that fiduciary law can be reimagined and transformed in a
public law location. More specifically, the tradition of equity is sen-
sitive to the public interest. Justice Story expounded on equity’s
association with public policy. He explained how equity intervened
100. See Tucker, supra note 49, at 222–24; see also Anenson & Mayer, supra note 43, at
967–74 (outlining scholarly criticism that fiduciary law is not protective enough in the corpo-
rate setting).
101. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 95, at 441–53.
102. Lahey & Anenson, supra note 2, at 312–13 (comparing mobility risk between types of
pension plans); id. at 324 (describing how defined contribution plans become fully vested
immediately so that employees may keep the full amount of an employer’s contribution in
comparison to defined benefit plans where employer contributions are tied to years of
service).
103. Anenson, Slabaugh & Lahey, supra note 6, at 53 (explaining the mobility penalty of
defined benefit plans as opposed to defined contribution plans such as the 401k). The de-
fined contribution plan is the predominant pension plan offered by private employers. Lahey
& Anenson, supra note 2, at 311. The percentage of employees participating in defined con-
tribution plans is roughly double that of defined benefit plans. Edward A. Zelinsky, The
Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 470 (2004).
104. See Muir, supra note 13, at 66–68 (examining public values and their relationship to
the enforcement and redress of financial wrongdoing in the private pension context); cf.
Jonathan D. Glater, Private Offerings and Public Ends: Reconsidering The Regime For Classification
of Investors Under The Securities Act of 1933, 48 CONN. L. REV. 355, 363–68 (2015) (discussing
the idea of publicness in corporate law). Certain states, however, equate pension and corpo-
rate fiduciaries. Honda ex rel. Kamakana v. Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 120 P.3d 237,
243 (Haw. 2005) (explaining that since the retirement system was statutorily granted the
powers of a corporation, the board has fiduciary responsibilities including a duty of good
faith). State statutes impose a duty of good faith in the interpretation of the law. See, e.g., N.
C. GEN. STAT. § 147-69.7(a)(6) (2013).
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when there was “tendency to . . . violate public confidence, or in-
jure the public interests.”105 The purpose of equity’s interference in
the public interest was to shut off the inducement to perpetrate a
wrong in the first place.106 It was not simply to remedy the wrong
after it had been done.107
State courts rely on public policy in the application and modifica-
tion of equitable principles.108 The Supreme Court has also imbued
modern equity law with the public interest.109 The public interest
doctrine allows judges to expand or contract equitable doctrines in
interpreting statutes, including those aimed at preventing the un-
conscientious abuse of rights at the foundation of fiduciary law.110
Public policy should be equally important in defining the fiduci-
ary relation between those managing public pension plans and
their beneficiaries. Government retirement systems operate in a po-
litical environment where pressure is exerted on and by plan
fiduciaries.111 By the same token, what becomes of the pension
plans has micro- and macroeconomic effects.112 The demise of pub-
lic retirement systems will extend beyond the financial deprivation
105. See MEAGHER, GUMMOW & LEHANE, supra note 54, at 335.
106. Anenson & Mark, supra note 19, at 1467 n.162. “By disarming the parties of all legal
sanction and protection for their acts, they suppress the temptations and encouragements
which might otherwise be found too strong for their virtue.” 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §258, at 265 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., 13th ed. 1886).
107. STORY, supra note 106, at 265.
108. See Anenson & Mark, supra note 19, at 1503–04 (discussing extension of the equita-
ble doctrine of unclean hands in the public interest); Anenson & Mayer, supra note 43, at 969
(discussing equitable defenses in light of the state courts’ time-honored role as guardians of
public policy).
109. Anenson & Mark, supra note 19, at 1481 (discussing the public interest as an integral
part of the equitable doctrines of inequitable conduct and unclean hands). The public inter-
est is one of the factors trial courts consider in exercising their discretion to grant or deny
equitable relief. See Gergen, Golden & Smith, supra note 74, at 204 (explaining the Supreme
Court’s four-factor test to determine an injunction to include irreparable injury, inadequacy,
balancing of hardships, and the public interest).
110. See Anenson & Mark, supra note 19, at 1467; see also Anenson, Age of Statutes, supra
note 47, at 12–18 (explaining how the public interest doctrine influences the application of
equitable defenses); Gene R. Shreve, Federal Injunctions and the Public Interest, 51 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 382, 382 (1983) (“The point [that equity courts may go further to give and withhold
relief in the public interest] has been restated so often by federal courts that it has become
an aphorism.”).
111. See, e.g., Hill v. Vanderbilt Capital Advisors, LLC, 834 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1255–57
(D.N.M. 2011) (claiming breach of fiduciary duty claims based in part on public pension
board members conflicts of interest in selecting investments to repay political favors and to
further their own political aspirations); Nasrawi v. Buck Consultants LLC, 179 Cal. Rptr. 3d
813, 817 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (listing multiple claims that the retirement association deliber-
ately kept the pension fund underfunded to avoid employer contributions).
112. Anenson, Slabaugh & Lahey, supra note 6, at 56; Jacob S. Hacker, Restoring Retirement
Security: The Market Crisis, the “Great Risk Shift,” and the Challenge for Our Nation, 19 ELDER L.J. 1,
2–3 (2011) (concluding that security in employer-sponsored public plans has even broader
implications for states individually and for the U.S. as a whole).
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of individual pension plan participants and their families.113 Failed
(and failing) pensions will adversely impact all state citizens.114 Tax-
payers will share the burden of plan insolvency when states raise
taxes to cover pensions.115 Given the pervasiveness of the public
pension problem across the country, individuals seeking to move to
another state to avoid additional tax liabilities will likely encounter
similar issues when they arrive.116
For state governments, the unsustainability of government pen-
sions will cause “higher funding costs for public employers
sponsoring the plans, higher general borrowing costs for states and
municipalities with insufficiently funded plans, and ultimately
higher borrowing costs for states regardless of how adequately their
benefit plans are funded.”117 State services, such as education fund-
ing, will also suffer repercussions where paying down the pension
debt will curtail them.118 The dire financial situation in several
states, especially California, led one analyst to conclude that “bank-
ruptcy or the complete cessation of all state functions save paying
benefits to retirees is not unthinkable.”119
The pension deficit is detrimental to the shared concerns of state
citizens in another manner as well. Government workers counting
on their pensions play an important social and economic role in
the welfare of their respective states. They have careers in educa-
tion and public safety, and include teachers, police, firefighters,
and first-responders. Thus, pension cuts “will almost certainly result
113. See Terrance O’Reilly, A Public Pensions Bailout: Economics & Law, 48 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 183, 222 (2014) (relating limited remedies against the government in the event of pen-
sion plan default).
114. Anenson, Slabaugh & Lahey, supra note 6, at 6.
115. Id.
116. See infra notes 205–06 (summarizing estimates of government pension plan default
across states).
117. Mendales, supra note 1, at 508 (citations omitted).
118. Anenson, Slabaugh & Lahey, supra note 6, at 34 (“Growing obligations raise the
specter of more taxes and less public services, including state funding of education.”); Gina
M. Raimondo, Truth in Numbers: The Security and Sustainability of Rhode Island’s Retirement Sys-
tem, at 8 (May 2011), http://www.ricouncil94.org/Portals/0/Uploads/Documents/General
%20Treasurer%20Raimondo%20report.pdf (“In recent years, state aid to cities and towns,
which is used mostly for K–12 education, has decreased annually by eight percent . . . .”); see
also Stuart Buck, Legal Obstacles to State Pension Reform, at 5 (Aug. 26, 2011), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1917563 (commenting on litigation in nine states and noting policy tradeoff be-
tween benefits and public services).
119. Maria O’Brien Hylton, Combating Moral Hazard: The Case for Rationalizing Public Em-
ployee Benefits, 45 IND. L. REV. 413, 434 (2012); see also Beermann, supra note 92, at 84
(“[California] which once boasted of the most comprehensive and inexpensive higher educa-
tion systems in the nation, is now finding it impossible, for example, to continue to offer
sufficient community college slots for all students.”).
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in a lower quality of applicants for [some] of the nation’s most im-
portant jobs.”120
The federal government will not be immune to the looming fi-
nancial disaster. It certainly recognizes that retirement savings
plans are a driver of the national economy.121 Even without a fed-
eral bailout,122 the nation as a whole will be adversely impacted as
government workers with little personal savings are forced into the
welfare system.123 Consequently, alarming actuarial deficits ad-
versely impact the economic welfare of the entire country and its
residents.
In summary, equity’s attention to the public interest dramatizes
fiduciary responsibilities in the public pension field. The underly-
ing indicia of fiduciary status, understood against the background
law of equity, helps to explain the content of fiduciary duties and
their seemingly stringent remedies. In fact, a fuller appreciation of
the fiduciary relation and its application in government retirement
120. Alicia H. Munnell & Rebecca Cannon Fraenkel, Compensation Matters: The Case of
Teachers, CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH AT BOS. COLL. (Jan. 2013), http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2013/01/slp28-1.pdf; Robert M. Costrell & Michael Podgursky, Teacher Pension Costs:
High, Rising, and Out of Control, EDUC. NEXT (June 25, 2013), http://educationnext.org/
teacher-pension-costs-high-rising-and-out-of-control/ (concluding that the high costs of
teacher defined benefit plans are real and are “crowding out other school spending and are
leading to layoffs of young teachers”); see also Anenson, Slabaugh & Lahey, supra note 6, at 4
(citing studies linking teacher quality to student achievement and the future of education).
121. Members of Congress attempted to facilitate a solution to the state pension debt
crisis because of its negative impact on the American economy. See Julia Lawless & Antonia
Ferrier, Hatch Releases Report Detailing Threat of $4.4 Trillion Public Pension Debt, U.S. SENATE
COMM. ON FIN., (Jan. 10, 2012), http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/ranking/re-
lease/?id=F9a92142-d190-4bca-a310-b43cb462eb45 (discussing report released by Senator
Orrin Hatch upon the introduction of a pension reform bill analyzing “how the unfunded
pension liabilities of state and local governments jeopardize the fiscal solvency of states and
municipalities as well as the nation’s long-term fiscal health, including the U.S. credit
rating”).
122. See, e.g., R. Eden Martin, Unfunded Public Pensions—The Next Quagmire, WALL STREET J.
(Aug.19, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405274870401790457540981322
3662860 (advising that “[t]he next big issue on the national political horizon” may be
whether the federal government should bail out the many states across the country with
“overly generous and badly underfunded pension plans”); see also Mark J. Warshawsky, Rose
A. Marchand & the Mercatus Center at George Mason Univ., The Extent and Nature of State and
Local Government Pension Problems and A Solution (January 2016), http://mercatus.org/sites/
default/files/Warshawsky-Govt-Pension-Problems.pdf (arguing that reform proposals that as-
sume the federal government will bail out state and local pensions are politically and
economically unworkable and unfair).
123. See Anenson, Slabaugh & Lahey, supra note 6, at 2 (relating that members of Con-
gress have even attempted to facilitate a solution to the state pension debt crisis due to its
negative impact on the American economy); see also Muir, supra note 24, at 402–04 (tracing
the historical events leading to the enactment of ERISA and Congress’ concern that private
pension plan failures will harm Social Security).
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systems can be realized by tracing it to the origins of equity
jurisdiction.124
The merger of law and equity, however, has obscured the evolu-
tion of equity.125 The removal of equity as a standard course in the
law school curriculum has aggravated the problem.126 Scholarship
on equity waned in the wake of these phenomena.127 As a result,
courts and commentators have lost sight of certain equitable doc-
trines along with the reasons for their existence.128 In this regard,
Roscoe Pound’s prediction at the turn of the twentieth century has
come true.129 He feared we would lose (and confuse) equitable
rules and principles after the fusion of law and equity.130 Courts
124. Smith, supra note 43, at 265; see also MEAGHER, GUMMOW & LEHANE, supra note 54, at
§ 1209, at 340 (“The solidification of various principles and doctrines has meant that in mod-
ern equity there has been a propensity to lose sight of Chancery’s inherent flexibility and
capacity to adjust to new situations by reference to mainsprings of the equity jurisdiction.”).
125. See generally T. Leigh Anenson, Limiting Legal Remedies: An Analysis of Unclean Hands,
99 KY. L.J. 63 (2010) [hereinafter Anenson, Limiting Legal Remedies] (discussing fusion and
confusion over equitable defenses in state and federal law after the unification of law and
equity).
126. See Anenson, Pluralistic Model, supra note 60, at 647 (“Many practicing lawyers have
graduated without the benefit of a comprehensive course in equity.”); Jerome Frank, Civil
Law Influences on the Common Law: Some Reflections on Comparative and Contrastive Law, 104 U.
PA. L. REV. 887, 895 (1956) (‘‘In several of our leading university law schools there is now no
course on ‘equity.’”); see generally Douglas Laycock, How Remedies Became a Field: A History, 27
REV. LITIG. 161, 249–60 (2008) (recounting the law school movement away from an equity
course to a remedies course in the 1970s).
127. The last treatises to provide a comprehensive treatment of equity were published in
the early twentieth century; these books were geared to practitioners and concentrated on
the technical aspects of equitable doctrines. See JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQ-
UITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Spencer W. Symons
ed., 5th ed. 1941); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (W.H. Lyon ed.,
14th ed. 1918); see also Anenson, The Triumph of Equity, supra note 51, at 438–39 (2008) (dis-
cussing lack of contemporary American treatises on equity). The latest literature to examine
equity holistically and philosophically was published in the middle of the twentieth century.
See, e.g., ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY (1950); WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK,
HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY (2d ed. 1956); HENRY MCCLINTOCK, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY (2d
ed. 1948). My research has sought to fill a critical gap in equity scholarship.
128. See generally Anenson & Mark, supra note 19 (critiquing the Federal Circuit for failing
to follow the equitable tradition in remaking the inequitable conduct doctrine). See Anenson,
Pluralistic Model, supra note 60, at 642 n.57 (commenting that there is a risk that courts may
pick up the broad phraseology of equitable ethical standards but not the broad sentiments
underlying them).
129. See Roscoe Pound, The Decadence of Equity, 5 COLUM. L. REV. 20, 35 (1905) (predicting
the decline of equity after the fusion of courts and procedures); Anenson, Age of Statutes,
supra note 47, at 7 (“Dean Roscoe Pound was prescient in cautioning against equity’s com-
partmentalization into discrete subject areas at the turn of the twentieth century.”).
130. Pound, supra note 129, at 29; see also Anenson & Mark, supra note 19, at 1450–52,
1504–05, 1511–12 (endorsing a trans-substantive approach to understanding equitable reme-
dies and defenses); Anenson, Age of Statutes, supra note 47, at 8 (explaining the benefits of a
wider and deeper theoretical frame of analysis).
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have carried equitable principles forward in their cases.131 Yet many
have ceased to understand them.132 Even trust law has been a victim
of historical incomprehension, and has been molded by mistakes
concerning the classification of equitable precepts.133
With respect to the fiduciary principle more generally, Henry
Smith argues that it too has been adversely affected since the union
of law and equity.134 He explains that fiduciary law is undergoing a
brand-identity crisis.135 He maintains that the theory of the fiduciary
relation should be reoriented back to its roots in equity.136 Examin-
ing equity in its historical setting tells us what it is and why it
existed. Smith calls this a “functional” approach, but it is based on
the equitable tradition.137 Consistent with my own research on eq-
uity,138 he describes how courts behaved in equity in order to
comprehend the historical reasons for their actions.139 In this way,
the heritage of equity becomes the touchstone for solving contem-
porary problems.140
Accordingly, the derivation of the fiduciary principle and its con-
nection to the grounds for equitable intervention serves as a
warning to those who would restrict the application of fiduciary
131. Anenson & Mark, supra note 19, at 1525 (“Equity is not lost, for it continues in a
steady stream of precedents, but it has ceased being understood.”).
132. Id. See Anenson, Limiting Legal Remedies, supra note 125, at 110, 63 (detailing court
confusion and describing the unclean hands doctrine as “the most powerful,” but also as the
“least containable defense that came from ancient courts of equity”).
133. Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable,” supra note 50, at 1351–54; see also Anen-
son & Mark, supra note 19, at 1525 n.554 (“In attempting to answer questions of equity,
members of the Supreme Court have disagreed over the existence or relevancy of a particular
custom, been mistaken as to what it is or means, and divided when traditional principles
purportedly deviate from practice.”).
134. Smith, supra note 43, at 261, 277; see id. at 282 (“Like equity after the fusion of law
and equity, it is hard to justify the mix of formalism and contextualism in a hybrid system if
the purpose of the architecture has been obscured.”).
135. Id. at 261.
136. Id. at 262 (“Cut off from the special rationales of equity, fiduciary law itself threatens
to become too expansive or too narrow and hidebound—like equity generally.”).
137. Id. at 262–63; id. at 261 (“This chapter will argue that a functional theory of equity—
of equity as a safety valve aimed at countering opportunism—captures the character of fiduci-
ary law.”); Anenson, Age of Statutes, supra note 47, at 8 (endorsing historical and functional
approach to equitable defenses and equity jurisprudence); Anenson, Statutory Interpretation,
supra note 47, at 3–4 (same).
138. There is no comprehensive treatment of modern equity in American law. My schol-
arship has concentrated on equitable principles with a special focus on equitable defenses.
See, e.g., T. LEIGH ANENSON, JUDGING EQUITY: THE FUSION OF UNCLEAN HANDS IN U.S. LAW
(forthcoming 2017).
139. See generally Smith, supra note 43.
140. See generally Anenson & Mayer, supra note 43 (using scholarship in business ethics to
inform the application of the equitable defense of unclean hands in solving the contractual
problem of excessive executive pay).
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law.141 Fiduciary law should be understood in its present form by
the concerns that provoked it.142 Moreover, equity’s association with
the public interest, along with its assistance of the vulnerable and its
regard for relieving against forfeiture found in the fiduciary rela-
tion, should caution against diluting the traditional duties of
trustees and other fiduciaries in managing critical retirement assets,
or in circumscribing the remedies available to beneficiaries in the
event of a breach. It bears repeating that possible political interfer-
ence is another reason to keep the fiduciary duties of the pension
trustees strong. Again, the potential damage from public pension
mismanagement or self-dealing is exceptionally egregious due to
extreme hardship, vulnerability, and hidden action.
Renewing and renovating equity, though, is not easy.143 Its ab-
sorption into public law is particularly complex.144 Government
pension law is but one of many examples of the integration of eq-
uity over time.145 Of course, what equity demands will depend on
the legal context, which for public pensions is state law.146 When in
doubt, however, it seems best to hew to the tradition of equity and
eschew changes that run counter to the temper of its history. The
reasons behind the rules should serve as guide.147 What is more,
based on the foregoing analysis, is that if states are going to regu-
late the fiduciary framework in a way that alters its equitable
141. Smith, supra note 43, at 275–77 (critiquing potential reforms in private fiduciary
law).
142. My research has been building a philosophical foundation in the present century for
the lost defenses of equity by resort to their past. See supra note 127.
143. Anenson, Treating Equity Like Law, supra note 74, at 469–71 (showing how unclean
hands doctrine has been extended to cases seeking legal relief). Anenson, Limiting Legal
Remedies, supra note 125, at 66, 109–15 (discussing the debate over the fusion of law and
equity).
144. Anenson, Age Of Statutes, supra note 47, at 8–37 (analyzing the assumption of equita-
ble defenses in federal statutes and explaining that modernizing equity is difficult); see also
Anenson & Mark, supra note 19, at 1502–05 (demonstrating how the inequitable conduct
doctrine in patent law can be legitimately transformed); see generally Muir, The Perversity of
ERISA Fiduciary Law, supra note 24, at 396–97 (explaining how ERISA is narrower than tradi-
tional trust law because the statute limits liability to the scope of fiduciary responsibilities and
broader than traditional trust law by extending liability to those managing assets not held in
trust).
145. HAROLD GREVILLE HANBURY, ARTICLES IN EQUITY 34 (1934) (“The stream of equity is,
in reality, continuous throughout ages.”); see NEWMAN, supra note 52, at 255 (“The evolution
of law is to a large extent the history of its absorption of equity.”); see also Laycock, The Tri-
umph of Equity, supra note 45, at 67–71 (commenting on various areas where equity integrated
the law).
146. See supra Parts I & III (providing an overview of public pension governances).
147. Smith, supra note 43, at 277 (“We should not lose sight of the danger of opportu-
nism in the historical core of fiduciary law.”); see also Anenson & Mayer, supra note 43, at 980
(advocating the use of unclean hands to prevent company executives’ unfair advantage-tak-
ing in their employment contracts).
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tradition, they should consider adding more, rather than less, pro-
tection from malfeasance in the management of government
retirement funds.148
To better evaluate the actual and potential fiduciary duties and
distinctions against their equitable past, it is essential to understand
the present context in which they arise. The content of the fiduci-
ary obligations allocated to the board and additional fiduciaries
depends on the specific roles they play in each state retirement sys-
tem. The next Part summarizes how fiduciaries function within the
governance mechanisms of public pensions.
III. GOVERNING PUBLIC PENSIONS
There are thousands of public retirement systems for state and
local employees in the United States.149 The defined benefit plan
remains the primary pension plan offered in these systems.150 In
comparison to other pensions, in which employees make the invest-
ment decisions and otherwise manage their own retirement
accounts, defined benefit plans are managed by the government in
an employer-owned trust fund.151 The governance of public retire-
ment systems is overseen by the governor, legislature, and the
board of trustees, including any staff to whom the board has dele-
gated administrative responsibility.152
Not surprisingly, the size and structure of the board, along with
member credentials, differs between public retirement systems.
Board members have different levels of knowledge and experience,
along with any necessary qualifications.153 Boards also vary in num-
ber and composition.154 How members are selected is likewise
148. It would be incorrect to say that the fiduciary relations in public pensions can never
circumscribe traditional duties. There may be situations where there is little risk of opportu-
nism or where other policy reasons trump equitable considerations.
149. Lahey & Anenson, supra note 2, at 307; Annual Survey of Public Pensions: State- and
Locally-Administered Defined Benefit Data (2014), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://
www.census.gov/ govs/retire/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2016) (tallying 6,299 public retirement
systems).
150. Lahey & Anenson, supra note 2, at 307, 313; Olivia S. Mitchell et al., Developments in
State and Local Pension Plans, in PENSIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 11, 15 (Olivia S. Mitchell &
Edwin C. Hustead eds., 2001). State governments may also separate pension systems within
the state for different kinds of employees. Lahey & Anenson, supra note 2, at 310.
151. Id. at 310–12. Unlike defined contribution plans where employees bear the risk of
their own retirement savings, defined benefit plans obligate employers to provide employees
retirement income regardless of market performance or other financial distress. Id. at 312.
152. Governance, supra note 15.
153. Id.
154. See id. (showing that retirement system board size ranges from five to nineteen trust-
ees across states with a median size of nine trustees).
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different;155 governors and legislatures appoint most trustees.156
Nevertheless, a majority of boards do have some active and retired
participants of the retirement system who are elected by their fellow
participants.157 Pension boards may also be comprised of ex-officio
members who tend to be state treasurers, budget officers, and su-
perintendents of public education.158
The types and degrees of responsibility and authority of pension
boards fluctuate among the fifty states.159 Any brief account of the
board’s role necessarily involves some simplification. Basically,
though, pension boards must comply with federal and state laws as
well as their own system’s policies and procedures.160 Their over-
sight responsibilities usually include accounting, financial
reporting, and actuarial evaluation.161 In particular, the board of
trustees may set actuarial assumptions, approve contribution rates,
and propose statutory revisions.162
155. Board of trustee composition at state and local pension systems falls into three cate-
gories depending on how they were selected: plan member-elected, politically appointed by
the governor or legislative committee, or ex officio trustees who serve because they hold a
particular public office. Hess, supra note 97, at 195; Governance, supra note 15 (specifying
selection methods as election, appointment, ex-officio).
156. Governance, supra note 15.
157. Id.; Hess, supra note 97, at 195. Board composition that includes plan participants
presumably independent of political influence result in better plan performance. Id. at
195–98, 216–17; Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Recon-
sidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 820 (1993). The stakeholder model, however, is not foolproof.
See Ed Mendel, CalPERS Considering Term Limits for Board Leaders (Dec. 21, 2015), https://
calpensions.com/2015/12/21/calpers-considering-term-limits-for-board-leaders/ (noting
that pension reform was introduced in California after state workers and the Highway Patrol
gave themselves large retroactive pension increases); cf. Dana Muir, ERISA and Investment
Issues, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 199, 205 (2004) [hereinafter Muir, ERISA and Investment Issues] (“Most
DB plans have a formal committee of fiduciaries, who are employees of the plan sponsors,
who oversee investment policy and practices.”).
158. Hess, supra note 97, at 195; Governance, supra note 15.
159. See Edwin C. Hustead & Olivia S. Mitchell, Public Sector Pension Plans: Lessons and
Challenges for the Twenty-First Century, in PENSIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 5, 8 (Olivia S. Mitch-
ell & Edwin C. Hustead eds., 2001) (explaining the typical duties of a retirement board);
Michael Useem & David Hess, Governance and Investments of Public Pensions, in PENSIONS IN
THE PUBLIC SECTOR, supra note 150, at 132 (state retirement systems differ in external or in-
house money managers, board oversight of investment strategy, and investment performance
of public plan assets).
160. Governance, supra note 15.
161. Id. Government employers play a more limited role with defined contribution pen-
sion plans. They may offer a selection of investment options to their employees and monitor
those options. See Dana M. Muir, Choice Architecture and the Locus of Fiduciary Obligation in
Defined Contribution Plans, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1, 15, 30–32 (2013) (discussing fiduciary law for
private pensions where employers retain fiduciary duties for selecting and monitoring of in-
vestment options from which participants choose).
162. Governance, supra note 15.
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A board’s obligations also typically include the appointment or
approval of top executive positions and consultants and the pay-
ment of benefits.163 Additionally, the overwhelming majority of
pension boards also oversee fund investments.164 Those systems that
do not make boards responsible for investing pension fund assets
designate a sole trustee or a separate entity for that purpose.165 Fur-
thermore, a board is tasked with ensuring that systems are in place
to report and monitor retirement system activities and processes.166
Accordingly, pension boards perform a grab bag of functions re-
lated to pension assets. In most cases, members of the board of
trustees, along with others to whom they have delegated authority,
are the primary guardians of these funds. The behavior of pension
boards and financial intermediaries are key to assuring asset integ-
rity. Their actions are out of the control of public sector employees
who rely on these plans for their retirement benefits.
Based on an understanding of traditional fiduciary principles,
the next Part turns to how the fiduciary relationship should be
structured in the setting of government retirement systems.
IV. REFORMING FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND ADJUDICATING FIDUCIARY
VIOLATIONS
An equitable outlook is admittedly incomplete. Because the fidu-
ciary relationship is an outgrowth of equitable tradition, however,
the cleansing power of equity should make that tradition a subject
of comparison.
There are a myriad ways for pension plan actors to violate their
obligations by acting wrongfully with respect to the corpus of the
trust. This Part does not attempt to obtain total completeness in
evaluating individual responsibility and its limits in the public pen-
sion system. The subject is so large that only a few representative
163. Id.
164. See id. (showing that seventy percent of states have pension boards that oversee fund
investments).
165. Id. (noting that in approximately thirty percent of states, pension boards do not
oversee fund investments). A sole trustee of pension funds can be found in Connecticut,
Michigan, New York, and North Carolina. Id. States that have separate entities managing
pension assets include Massachusetts (Pension Reserves Investment Management Board),
Minnesota (State Board of Investment), and Oregon (Investment Council). Id.
166. Governance, supra note 15. E.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 11:832 (1991) (requiring the board
of trustees to keep a record of its proceedings which shall be open to public inspection and
to publish annually a report of its fiscal transactions, amount of accumulated cash and securi-
ties, and a balance sheet showing the financial condition of the system by means of an
actuarial valuation of assets and liabilities).
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instances of fiduciary responsibility in the public pension scenario
are examined below.
This Part does extend its analysis beyond the usual issues involv-
ing the theft of funds and inappropriate investments or asset
diversification to translate private trust law into the public regime
of pension plan administration.167 As an overview, the types of be-
haviors that may give rise to liability involve inadequate funding
and disclosures as well as incurring unreasonable investment
costs.168 Governments should also reform existing law by removing
any scienter requirement for fiduciary liability and, when feasible,
prohibiting dual roles of fiduciaries that may influence
opportunism.
As explained above, standards as opposed to rules are the best fit
for an equitable approach. As such, the need for equitable discre-
tion should caution state governments and courts from making
fiduciary law overly rigid, especially by creating catalogues of per-
missive actions. Lists of prohibitions may be appropriate,169 but
even those can be problematic if they curtail fiduciary discretion in
the legitimate performance of their functions.170
Considering equity’s approach to the duty of loyalty, state gov-
ernments should nonetheless consider banning dual roles of
fiduciaries that may affect their judgment and promote opportu-
nism.171 Barring perks to board members by money managers,
including travel, should also be considered. Prohibiting fiduciaries
167. See generally Webber, supra note 14 (arguing for an expanded discretion to consider
the impact on member jobs in making investment decisions). For public pension funds, Pro-
fessor Webber argues that considering the impact on jobs should not be a fiduciary violation.
It is unclear if his position is also that the failure to account for such job prospects would
result in a violation.
168. Muir, The Perversity of ERISA Fiduciary Law, supra note 24, at 409 (listing fiduciary
behaviors that result in violations); Muir, Decentralized Enforcement to Combat Financial Wrongdo-
ing in Pensions, supra note 13, at 52–59 (ascribing wrongdoing to three categories: (1) asset
transfers from pension plans, (2) acts prior to transfer of funds to a pension plan, and (3)
financial wrongdoing with collateral effects on pension plans).
169. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.650(5) (“Based upon market value at the time of
purchase, the board shall limit the amount of assets managed by any one (1) active or passive
investment manager to fifteen percent (15%) of the assets in the pension and insurance
funds.”).
170. Experience with ERISA demonstrates that prohibitions can be problematic when
they are overbroad and lack the individualized decision-making ability of equity judges. See
Muir, The Perversity of ERISA Fiduciary Law, supra note 24, at 397 (advising of certain prohib-
ited transactions that are so broad that the Department of Labor has established exemptions
from them).
171. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 11 (“Some of the nation’s largest public pension funds
already bar consultants from acting as investment managers because of concerns about the
dual roles, but many don’t.”).
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from working in certain businesses for a period of time after termi-
nating their role on the pension board may be appropriate as well.
At a minimum, there should be a process in place in which prospec-
tive and existing fiduciaries are vetted to ensure that no conflicts of
interest exist (or are acceptable).172 History teaches that whenever a
fiduciary can benefit at the expense of plan participants and benefi-
ciaries, there will be an incentive for opportunistic behavior.173
Recall that the purpose of the “no profit” and “no conflict” rules of
fiduciary law is to preclude the fiduciary from being influenced by
considerations of personal interest and misusing the position for
personal advantage. State governments should additionally disallow
fiduciaries from waiving or otherwise limiting their obligations as is
often found in corporate law.174
A related issue involving the duty to act in the sole interest of
plan beneficiaries is what to do when the retirement board, by vari-
ous means, wrongfully reduces the employer’s contribution.175 In
California, at least one state court has granted retirement boards
172. There may be unavoidable conflicts under certain circumstances in the public pen-
sion domain or those that are deemed acceptable for other reasons. For example, if the state
treasurer sits on the pension board, there may be a conflict of interest in setting pension
funding policy with her obligation to fund schools or with investments in state infrastructure.
A union member on the board may have a conflict with member interests in health care,
wages, and limiting layoffs. ERISA allows agents of plan sponsors and of other fiduciaries to
act as ERISA fiduciaries for fear that the increased cost of impartial decisionmaking would
discourage sponsorship of pension plans. Muir, The Perversity of ERISA Fiduciary Law, supra
note 24, at 414–15 (noting tension between ERISA’s recognition of a conflicted beneficiary
with its duty of loyalty).
173. Muir, The Perversity of ERISA Fiduciary Law, supra note 24, at 409.
174. See Smith, supra note 43, at 282 (citing Andrew S. Gold, On the Elimination of Fiduciary
Duties: A Theory of Good Faith for Unincorporated Firms, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123 (2006) and
citing Scott Johnston, Opting Out: Bargaining for Fiduciary Duties in Cooperative Ventures, 70
WASH. U.L.Q. 291 (1992)); see id. at 271 (explaining that contracting out should be difficult
when exploitation is unforeseeable and where equity seeks to keep its signals straight); cf.
Willborn, supra note 96, at 160 (prohibiting agreements to exonerate fiduciary responsibili-
ties); ERISA § 410, 29 U.S.C. § 1110(a) (“[A]ny provision in an agreement or instrument
which purports to relieve a fiduciary from responsibility or liability for any responsibility,
obligation, or duty under this part shall be void as against public policy.”). Waiving liability
may be more likely in those states that equate corporate and pension fiduciary duties. See
Kaho’ohanohano v. State, 162 P.3d 696, 705 (Haw. 2007) (explaining that pension trustees
are “functionally equivalent to those of a board of directors of a private corporation”).
175. See O’Neal v. Stanislaus Cty Emps. Ret. Ass’n, No. F061439, 2012 WL 1114677 *7
(Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2012) (finding complaint stated a cause of action when it alleged that
the retirement association, through its governing retirement board, “took funds that had
been set aside to provide discretionary supplemental retirement benefits, including health
insurance benefits, and used those funds for a different and impermissible purpose, namely,
to lower the county’s employer contribution for the years in question”) (citing 79 Ops. Cal.
Atty. Gen. 95, 99–101 (1996) (use of excess earnings to reduce current county employer
contribution violates County Employment Retirement Law)).
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and associations statutory immunity from such claims seeking dam-
ages to the fund.176 The interplay between the law of pension
governance and government immunity should be reconsidered, or
the waiver of immunity for fiduciary claims should be made clear.
Another reform that government retirement systems should con-
sider is to remove the requirement of intent to trigger fiduciary
liability. In Wyoming, for example, the legislature amended the
statute to “make clear” that board members are not personally lia-
ble for acting within the scope of their responsibilities unless their
conduct rises to the level of “willful misconduct, intentional torts or
illegal acts.”177 While fiduciary law may seem far-reaching, it is nec-
essary in light of the structure of the relationship and the interests
at stake. Again, equitable doctrines were derived in the service of
safeguarding against strategic behavior.178 Fiduciary law is even
broader than general equity because of the sustained problem of
opportunism.179 But the law is also limited due to the fact that per-
sonal liability only attaches to those who choose to become a
fiduciary.180 Third party claims are also restricted to those with
knowledge.181 As such, states should not elevate the criteria against
actuaries, accountants, pension advisors, or anyone else who aids
and abets fiduciary breaches by pension boards to require specific
intent.182 In fact, states should consider expanding by legislation or
176. See Nasrawi v. Buck Consultants L.L.C., 179 Cal. Rptr. 3d 813, 822–23 (Cal. Ct. App.
2014) (finding retirement association immune under government immunity statute for
breaches of fiduciary duties involving discretionary acts of the pension board); see also Hill v.
Vanderbilt Capital Advisors, L.L.C., 834 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1272–77 (D.N.M. 2011) (discussing
but not deciding whether statutory sovereign immunity in tort bars claims against retirement
board for breach of fiduciary duty).
177. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-3-443(e) (West 2015).
178. See discussion supra Part II (examining the equitable dimension of fiduciary law).
179. Id.
180. Smith, supra note 43, at 278–79 (arguing that fiduciary law is not overbroad because
it is difficult to become a fiduciary and liability is limited to third parties with knowledge). See
Hittle v. Santa Barbara County Emps. Ret. Ass’n., 703 P.2d 73, 84 (Cal. 1985) (noting that
retirement association officers, by acceptance of their position, become voluntary trustees
subject to fiduciary obligations).
181. The beneficiaries of a trust may also sue responsible third parties; a beneficiary may
bring an action against a third-party where “the trustee improperly refuses or neglects to
bring an action.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 25, § 282(2).
182. See Nasrawi v. Buck Consultants L.L.C., 179 Cal. Rptr. 3d 813, 826 (Ct. App. 2014)
(commenting that “some cases suggest that a plaintiff also must plead specific intent to facili-
tate the underlying [breach]” for aiding and abetting liability). But see In re First Alliance
Mortg. Co., 471 F.3d 977, 993 (9th Cir. 2006) (explaining that “aiding and abetting liability
under California law, as applied by the California state courts, requires a finding of actual
knowledge, not specific intent”).
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adjudication who may become a fiduciary of public pensions be-
yond retirement boards or other designated entities.183
Fiduciary breaches often occur in the absence of fraud and cor-
ruption. Examples abound of neglect, inadvertence, or
incompetence. As an initial matter, the standard of review of a
board’s discretionary decisions are an open question in some states.
Courts (or legislatures) should refrain from adopting the deferen-
tial business judgment rule found in the law of corporate
governance.184
With respect to specific fiduciary violations, state pension funds
nationwide are beginning to more closely examine how much they
are paying Wall Street to manage their investments.185 These man-
agement fees can exceed more than a billion dollars and result in a
substantial weight on returns.186 CalPERS’ failure to account for
some of its investment fees is an especially clear violation of fiduci-
ary obligations.187 By analogy, a private fiduciary’s failure to
183. See discussion supra Part II. There appears to be no case where parties have raised
the question in interpreting government pension law. See Luzerne County Ret. Bd. v. Makow-
ski, 627 F. Supp. 2d 506, 565 (M.D. Penn. 2007) (explaining that former board members
owed fiduciary duties to the fund pursuant to state statute and assuming that financial advi-
sors and money managers also owed fiduciary duties to the fund for purposes of determining
federal law); see also Muir, The Perversity of ERISA Fiduciary Law, supra note 24, at 395 (explain-
ing that an individual becomes an ERISA fiduciary when they exercise discretion over the
assets, management, or administration of the plan or they provide investment advice for
compensation while limiting liability to only those functions performed).
184. For decisions raising, but not deciding the issue, see Bandt v. Board of Retirement,
San Diego County Employees Retirement Ass’n, 38 Cal. Rptr. 3d 544, 555–56 (Ct. App. 2006)
(advising that neither party has offered a constitutional standard to determine whether a
retirement board has violated its fiduciary duties and suggesting that the law of corporate
governance and its business judgment rule may be appropriate as opposed to other standards
that are less deferential to the retirement board’s judgement); O’Neal v. Stanislaus County
Employees’ Retirement Ass’n, No. F061439, 2012 WL 1114677 at *6 n.8 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 4,
2012) (noting that “potential defenses of [the retirement association] under the so-called
‘business judgment’ rule . . . are not before the court”). Cf. Muir, The Perversity of ERISA
Fiduciary Law, supra note 24, at 410 (advising that discretion, a factor crucial in determining
fiduciary status, is also a key factor is determining deference, and therefore a significant
limitation to finding liability for violated fiduciary standards).
185. Stevenson, supra note 10; see also Gretchen Morgenson, When Private Equity Firms Give
Retirees the Short End, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2015) (disclosing that Wall Street is charging
higher fees to pensions funds versus other investors). There may be other lawsuits involving
costs paid by the fund. See Board of Trustees of City of Omaha Police and Fire Ret. Sys. v. City
of Omaha, 858 N.W.2d 186, 194 (Neb. 2015) (holding that pension board had authority to
retain an actuarial consultant for advice and to study underfunding which was an administra-
tive cost to be paid by the city and not an investment cost to be paid by fund).
186. Stevenson, supra note 10 (citing study by CEM Benchmarking); see also Muir, Decen-
tralized Enforcement To Combat Financial Wrongdoing in Pensions, supra note 13, at 57 (“Providers
of services to pension plans, for example, investment managers, record-keepers and auditors,
have an inventive to maximize their fees.”).
187. See CAL. CONST. art. XVI § 17(a)–(c) (imposing prudent investor rule and for fiduci-
aries to “defray[ ] reasonable expenses of administering the system”); see generally Stevenson,
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monitor and evaluate investment costs has recently been held to be
a breach under ERISA.188 Moreover, it makes sense that a reasona-
bly prudent fiduciary would not only ascertain the quoted fees by
Wall Street, but also to check them against actual fees incurred.189
Further, to keep investment expenses reasonable, the fiduciary obli-
gation should require trustees to consolidate fund management to
create economies of scale.190
Perhaps a more contentious issue on the horizon, but one that
should also result in fiduciary liability, is the failure to accurately
evaluate liabilities that lead to inadequate funding and disclo-
sure.191 The undervaluation of the pension deficit is due in part to
an unsuitable discount rate.192 There is a growing consensus among
economists and other scholars that private sector actuarial stan-
dards should be used to give an adequate representation of the
supra note 10. According to CalPERS annual report, it paid $1.6 billion in fees to Wall Street
in 2014, but the figure does not include how much it paid in carried interest which could be
as much as an additional $1 billion a year. Id. Private equity firms typically charge investors a
management fee of one to two percent of assets and about twenty percent of any gains each
year. Id. But fees for transactions, costs for monitoring investments and legal fees are not
readily disclosed. Id.
188. See Tussey v. ABB, Inc., 746 F.3d 327, 336–37 (8th Cir. 2014) (upholding a failure to
monitor claim because the defendants made no effort to benchmark the fees being paid and
there was no evidence that they attempted to use purchasing power ($1.4B) to reduce fees).
189. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.650(1)(c)(2) (LexisNexis 2015) (requiring fiducia-
ries to incur only reasonable investment expenses); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 100–A:15.1–a.(a)(5) (2012) (requiring fiduciaries to incur only “costs that are appropriate
and reasonable”); Meeting Your Fiduciary Responsibilities, UNITED STATES DEPT. OF LABOR 5–6
(Feb. 2012), https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/re
source-center/publications/meetingyourfiduciaryresponsibilities.pdf (explaining that fiduci-
aries of private pension plans must monitor fees for service providers and investments paid
from plan assets by checking promised fees against actual fees incurred); UMPERSA, supra
note 41, at § 7 (fiduciary responsibilities include incurring only reasonable costs of invest-
ment). A fiduciary breach regarding investment fees may also arise due to the failure to
disclose such fees. See Luzerne Cty. Ret. Bd. v. Makowski, 627 F. Supp. 2d 506 (M.D. Pa. 2007)
(holding that pension fiduciaries owed duty to disclose material information under Penn-
sylvania law and discussing claim of concealment of investment fees). But see Hill v.
Vanderbilt Capital Advisors, LLC, 834 F. Supp.2d 1228, 1255–57 (D.N.M. 2011) (finding the
beneficiaries lacked Article III standing for breach of fiduciary duty claims based in part on
board members lack of due diligence in monitoring fees because beneficiaries failed to al-
lege that the defined benefit plan is currently underfunded or that the investment losses
caused the underfunding).
190. See Mendales, supra note 1, at 543 (urging states to reform their retirement systems
by consolidating pension plans, if legally and politically possible, to defray costs).
191. See Lahey & Anenson, supra note 2, at 315. (“[T]he predominant calculation used to
evaluate defined benefit plans is the funding ratio. This ratio measures a plan’s financial
health by dividing the market or actuarial value of assets by the liabilities. If liabilities exceed
assets, the plan is underfunded.”).
192. Anenson, Slabaugh & Lahey, supra note 6, at 46–48. See also J. Fred Giertz & Leslie E.
Papke, Public Pension Plans: Myths and Realities for State Budgets, 60 NAT’L TAX J. 305 (2007)
(finding evidence that assumptions are manipulated in order to lower necessary contribu-
tions to the pension plans).
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default risk.193 This would mean “valuing pension liabilities accord-
ing to the likelihood of payment, rather than to the return
expected on pension assets.”194 Overstating pension health lowers
necessary contributions to the plan.195 In a defined benefit plan
paradigm, government employers promise to contribute to the plan
at whatever levels are necessary to fund the plan.196 Funding levels
affect both benefit security and the ability to receive enhanced ben-
efits.197 In most states, there are no legally mandated minimum
funding levels like that for private sector pensions so the criteria for
determining funding are even more important for public sector
pensions.198 No doubt pension actuaries, in response, will rely on
the fact that the discount rate is an industry standard.199 Yet Car-
dozo captured the elevated ethical standards of equity and fiduciary
law when he stated that fiduciaries are “kept at a level higher than
193. Eileen Norcross & Andrew Biggs, The Crisis in Public Sector Pension Plans: A Blueprint
for Reform in New Jersey 2 (Mercatus Ctr., George Mason Univ., Working Paper No. 10-31, June
2010), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/WP1031—NJ-Pensions.pdf (noting that
“economists almost universally agree” that private sector accounting methods are more ap-
propriate than current public sector assumptions in calculating pension liabilities). See Novy-
Marx & Rauh, supra note 3, at 1211 (asserting that the appropriate discount rate to calculate
liabilities should reflect risk from a taxpayer perspective rather than the expected rate of
return on pension assets as stipulated by government accounting rules); O’Reilly, supra note
113, at 222 (arguing for private actuarial standards for public pensions). See also Beerman,
supra note 92, at 13–14 (comparing contrary studies on the public pension debt and conclud-
ing that the pension crisis is real).
194. Anenson, Slabaugh & Lahey, supra note 6, at 46–47. The effect would cut the inter-
est rate by half (eight percent to four percent) and more than triple unfunded liabilities for
public sector pensions. Id. at 48. Cf. Mendales, supra note 1, at 533–37 (concluding that the
usual discount rate of eight percent is too high for government pensions, but that four per-
cent may be too low for large plans).
195. See Lahey & Anenson, supra note 2, at 310 (“A defined benefit plan provides for
employer, and sometimes employee, contributions to a trust fund administered by a trus-
tee.”); Anenson, Slabaugh & Lahey, supra note 6, at 13 (“Increasing the contribution rate for
employees, employers, or both, should increase the funds available to invest in the existing
portfolio of assets.”). Additional funds add to the dollar amount of assets and, ideally, to the
investment income which may decrease the unfunded pension liability. See Muir, ERISA and
Investment Issues, supra note 157, at 202–04 (explaining that contributions and investment
returns are the two primary inputs that affect funding levels in defined benefit plans). See
generally ALLEN ET AL., supra note 95, at 441–53
196. Muir, ERISA and Investment Issues, supra note 157, at 202–04.
197. Id. (explaining how funding levels ease workforce reductions, cost of living al-
lowances, and other collateral benefits).
198. See T. Leigh Anenson & Karen Eilers Lahey, The Crisis in Corporate America: Private
Pension Liability and Proposals for Reform, 9 U. PA. LAB. & EMP. L. 495, 495–96 (2007) (explain-
ing that Congress took corrective action in the private sector by mandating adequate funding
and plan termination insurance after a series of business failures). A few states do mandate
minimum funding levels. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74–4921(5) (2014); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 49–11–301(5) (West 2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 472a(b) (2013).
199. Depending on the circumstances, lawsuits may arise against the retirement board
and/or association for breach of fiduciary duty due to the failure to sue the actuaries for
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that trodden by the crowd.”200 Fiduciary integrity in assigning the
correct rate of return on plan assets will lead to the financial integ-
rity of government pensions.
The discount rate question may also result in liability when fidu-
ciaries provide advice to plan participants with a choice of plans.201
A common reform in many state retirement systems is to allow gov-
ernment employees to choose between plan types.202
Finally, equitable defenses may limit the liability of fiduciaries.
This could occur if an alleged breach of duty results from a deci-
sion of the board that has pension plan participants serving on it.
The agreement by participant board members may be attributed to
all pension plan participants and raise issues of acquiescence and
estoppel.203 In the application of equitable defenses, however,
judges have residual discretion to refuse such defenses under the
circumstances of the case and the corresponding policies.204
negligence or directly against actuaries for aiding and abetting fiduciary violations by pen-
sion managers. See, e.g., Nasrawi v. Buck Consultants L.L.C., 179 Cal. Rptr. 3d 813, 822–23
(Ct. App. 2014).
200. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
201. See Hittle v. Santa Barbara Cty. Emps. Ret. Assn., 703 P.2d 73, 85 (Cal. 1985) (ruling
that county retirement association failed to comply with fiduciary obligation to accurately
inform beneficiary of retirement options). See also Muir, Decentralized Enforcement To Combat
Financial Wrongdoing in Pensions, supra note 13, at 58–59 (discussing misleading disclosures by
fiduciaries to private pension participants). Cf. Muir, The Perversity of ERISA Fiduciary Law,
supra note 24, at 404–10 (explaining why there are many opportunities for strategic behavior
in the pension benefit administration context).
202. Anenson, Slabaugh & Lahey, supra note 6, at 53; Alicia H. Munnell et al., Why Have
Some States Introduced Defined Contribution Plans?, 3 CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH AT BOS. C. (Jan.
2008). See also Lahey & Anenson, supra note 2, at 326–28 (supporting the movement to op-
tional or exclusive defined contribution plans, coupled with an employee education program
describing the distinction). Because employees manage their own funds, defined contribu-
tion plans are always fully funded. Id. at 312. Therefore, the defined contribution plan has an
economic advantage for government employers of removing responsibility for underfunded
or underperforming fund assets. Anenson, Slabaugh & Lahey, supra note 6, at 51–52.
203. See Anenson, Role of Equity, supra note 68, at 51–52 (outlining similarities and differ-
ences among equitable defenses); Anenson & Mayer, supra note 43, at 980 (explaining
acquiescence). See also YOUNG ET AL, supra note 21, § 7.450, at 550 (examining defensive
equities in trust law such as acquiescence). Other equitable defenses may also apply. See
O’Neal v. Stanislaus Cty. Emps.’ Ret. Ass’n, No. F061439, 2012 WL 1114677 *6 (Cal. Ct. App.
Apr. 4, 2012) (“[I]f a beneficiary with knowledge of the trustee’s breach of fiduciary duty
does not seek judicial relief, the beneficiary may be guilty of laches, precluding such equita-
ble relief.”).
204. See Anenson & Mark, supra note 19, at 1500–02; Anenson, Treating Equity Like Law,
supra note 74, at 461. See also Oakland v. Oakland Police and Fire Ret. Sys., 169 Cal. Rptr. 3d
51, 83 (Ct. App. 2014) (“[A]s with estoppel ‘laches is not available where it would nullify an
important policy adopted for the benefit of the public.’” (citing Feduniak v. Cal. Coastal
Comm’n., 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 591 (2007))); Medina v. Board of Ret., Los Angeles Cty. Emps.
Ret. Ass’n, Cal. Rptr. 3d 634, 637 (Ct. App. 2003) (discussing public policy consideration in
the application of estoppel in retirement benefits dispute).
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In conclusion, legions of Americans working in the public sector
are at risk of losing their pensions.205 Government plans have failed
to build and maintain sufficient asset reserves to meet their benefit
commitments.206 In California and other states, some blame will at-
tach to those who manage and maintain these funds. Holding
fiduciaries charged with protecting plan assets to high standards
and individual accountability is an important means of maintaining
these important streams of retirement income.207 An equitable per-
spective suggests that, if anything, the law should aspire to a
stronger legal bond between public pension trustees and benefi-
ciaries than exists under extant law. To the extent that high
obligations affect fiduciary behavior, such as turning over the in-
house management of assets to outside investment managers or de-
terring board membership by those less financially astute, such
changes can only benefit public pension systems.208
205. Anenson, Slabaugh & Lahey, supra note 6, at 12 (“[P]rojections estimate that plans
in seven states will be insolvent by 2020 and plans in half the states will be broke by 2027.”)
(citations omitted).
206. Anenson, Slabaugh & Lahey, supra note 6, at 5 (“[S]tate pensions are collectively
somewhere between $700 billion and $4.6 trillion short of the funding needed to meet their
actuarial liabilities.”); id. at 48 n.281 (“[D]ata from the Bureau of Labor of Statistics show
that public pension obligations account for almost seventeen percent of all public debt in the
United States.”); see generally Issue Brief: State and Local Government Spending on Public
Employee Retirement Systems, NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE RET. ADM’RS 3 (May, 2014) http://
www.teacherpensions.org/sites/default/files/NASRACostsBrief.pdf.
207. Almost fifty years ago, the Supreme Court of California echoed this sentiment:
In the vast development of pensions in today’s complex society, the numbers of pen-
sion funds and pensioners have multiplied, and most employees, upon retirement,
now become entitled to pensions earned by years of service. We believe that courts
must be vigilant in protecting the rights of the pensioner against powerful and distant
administrators; the relationship should be one in which the administrator exercises
toward the pensioner a fiduciary duty of good faith and fair dealing.
Symington v. Albany, 485 P.2d 270, 276 (Cal. 1971).
208. See discussion supra Part III (summarizing governance mechanisms in public pension
systems). Regarding a financially astute board, Governor Brown in California issued a pen-
sion reform plan in 2011 that included changes to the pension board. Mendel, supra note
157. To achieve greater independence and sophistication, he proposed adding two indepen-
dent, public members with financial expertise to the CalPERS board and to replace the
Personnel Board designee with the governor’s Finance director. Id. However, the law enacted
only requires CalPERS board members to receive twenty-four hours of education every two
years. Id. The pension consulting industry may need more effective regulation to prevent
conflicts of interest or better policing by pension funds themselves. See Fitzpatrick, supra note
11 (reporting on the call for increased surveillance of the pension consulting industry and
noting that seventy-five percent of pension consulting firms registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission act in dual roles as consultants and investment managers).
286 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 50:2
CONCLUSION
Controversies involving fund management may be the next fron-
tier of public pension litigation.209 With the specter of massive
defaults on the horizon, this Article advances the retirement reform
debate by looking more closely at the fiduciary relationship that ex-
ists between trustees and beneficiaries involving government
pension funds. It offers a singular view from historic equity.
The Article aims to see how equity in the medieval world relates
to the modern pension problem. From that viewpoint, it evaluates
what the fiduciary relation means, or should mean, in the changing
legal environment of public retirement systems.210 The main objec-
tive is to raise issues involving the fiduciary principle that have been
undervalued or ignored. The purpose of the discussion is not to
offer a simple solution to this complicated problem. Any such reso-
lution would be impossible in light of the distinctive governance
mechanisms of public pensions and their divergent legal
architecture.
Nevertheless, based upon fiduciary law’s ancestry in equity, the
Article offers guidance in assigning and defining obligations and
associated remedies in the public pension situation. Contemplating
the equitable dimension of the public pension problem, it analyzes
certain circumstances where fiduciary violations may arise and sug-
gests possible outcomes. It also comments on deficiencies in
current law. Overall, the appraisal provides a deeper perspective of
the fiduciary principle and corresponding doctrine in the context
of government retirement systems.
209. Anenson, Slabaugh & Lahey, supra note 6, at 15–34 (surveying constitutional chal-
lenges to state pension reform).
210. Id. at 11 (“Pension reform has taken center stage in the public policy debate as states
struggle to deal with the fallout from the Great Recession.”); see id. at 11–14 (analyzing re-
forms in thirteen states from 2007–2015).
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APPENDIX
COMPARISON OF STATE PENSION CODES AND
ERISA FIDUCIARY DUTIES211
State Citation Duty of Duty of Duty of Duty of Duty of Duty of Duty of
Loyalty212 Care: Care: Care: Care: Care: Care:
General General General Prudent Prudent Prudent
Same Close Similar Investor Investor Investor
Purpose Rule Rule Rule
Same Close Similar
Purpose
ALA. CODE § 36- X X X
26-14(g) (2013)
(duty of loyalty)Alabama ALA. CODE § 36-
36-8 (duty of
care)
ALASKA STAT. X X X
Alaska § 39.35.011
(2012)
ARIZ. REV. X X X
STAT. ANN.Arizona § 38-712(D)
(2014)
ARK. CODE X X X
Arkansas ANN. § 24-2-207
(2013)
CAL. CONST. X X X
California art. XVI,
§ 17(a)
COLO. X X X
STAT.§ 31-31-Colorado 901(3)
(2014)213
CONN. GEN. X X X
Connecticut STAT. § 5-
155a(c) (2013)
DEL. CODE ANN. X
Delaware tit. 29, § 5541
(2014)
FLA. STAT. X X X
Florida § 122.355(2)
(2013)
GA. CODE ANN. X X X
Georgia § 47-1-85(a)
(2014)
HAW. REV. X X X
STAT. § 88-Hawaii 22.5(a)(1)
(2013)
211. This chart is intended to show the similarities and differences between the statutory
fiduciary law of public pensions and private pensions regulated by federal law. It is not a
comprehensive account of all fiduciary law in each state. Given Professor Webber’s state-wide
survey comparing the language and purpose of ERISA’s duty of loyalty, see Webber, supra
note 14, at 2188 (Appendix), this chart adds a detailed account of the duty of care.
212. For a detailed comparison of the duty of loyalty, see Webber, supra note 14, at 2188
(Appendix).
213. This provision applies solely to Colorado’s fire and police pension fund.
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40 ILL. COMP. X X X
STAT. ANN. 5 /Illinois 1- 109(a)
(2014)
IND. CODE ANN. X X X
§ 5-10-5.5-Indiana 2.5(b)(2)
(2013)
IOWA CODE X X XIowa § 410. 3 (2014)
KAN. STAT. X X X
ANN. § 74-Kansas 4921(1)(2)
(2014)















MD. CODE X X X
ANN., STATE
Maryland PERS. & PENS.
§ 21-203 (West
2014)
MASS. GEN. X X X
LAWS ANN. ch.Massachusetts 32 § 23(3)
(2014)
MICH. COMP. X X X
LAWS ANN.Michigan § 38.1133(3)
(2014)
MINN. STAT. X X X
Minnesota ANN. § 356.001
(b) (2014)
Mississippi
MO. REV. STAT. X X X
Missouri § 105.688(3)(4)
(2014)
MONT. CONST. X X XMontana art. 8, § 15(1)
NEB. REV. STAT. X X X
Nebraska § 72-1239.01(b)
(2014)
NEV. REV. STAT. X X X
§ 287.430(2)
(2014) (duty of
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N. H. REV. X X X
STAT. ANN.
§ 100-A:15 (I-New Hampshire
a)(a)(2)(3)(5)
(6) (2012)
N. J. STAT. ANN. X
New Jersey § 43:15A-5(i)-(l)
(West 2014)
N. M. CONST. X X XNew Mexico art. 20, § 22(a)









N. C. GEN. X X X
STAT. § 147-North Carolina 69.7(a)(2)(3)
(5)(6) (2013)
N. D. CENT. X X X
North Dakota CODE § 54-52.3-
03 (2013)
OHIO REV. X X X
CODE ANN.Ohio § 145.11(A)
(West 2014)
OKLA. STAT. X X X
ANN. tit. 74,Oklahoma § 909.1(A)(1)
(West 2014)
OR. REV. STAT. X X X
Oregon § 243.435(2)
(2013)
71 PA. CONS. X X X
STAT. ANN.Pennsylvania § 5931(e) (West
2012)
R. I. GEN. LAWS X X X
Rhode Island § 35-10-6(b)
(2011)
S. C. CODE X X X
South Carolina ANN. § 9-16-40
(Supp. 2013)
S. D. CODIFIED X X X
South Dakota LAWS § 3-13-51.1
(2013)
TENN. CODE X X X
ANN. § 8-36-Tennessee 920(f) (Supp.
2013)
TEX. GOV’T X X X
CODE ANN.Texas § 825.101 (West
2012)
UTAH CODE X X X
ANN. § 49-11-Utah 301(3) (West
2013)
VT. STAT. ANN. X X X
Vermont tit. 3, § 472a(b)
(2013)
290 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 50:2




WASH. REV. X X X
CODE ANN.Washington § 41.50.780(4)
(West 2014)
W. VA. CODE X X X
West Virginia § 5- 10B-10(a)
(2014)
WIS. STAT. X X X
Wisconsin § 40.01(2)
(2013)
WYO. STAT. X X X
ANN. § 9-3-Wyoming 439(a)(ii)
(2013)
